

EXHIBIT J

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10 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
11 **NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**
12 **SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION**

13 GOOGLE LLC,

14 Plaintiff

15 v.

Case No. 3:20-cv-06754-WHA

16 SONOS, INC.,

17 Defendant.

18
19 **GOOGLE LLC’S NINTH SUPPLEMENTAL OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO**
20 **PLAINTIFF SONOS, INC.’S FIRST SET OF FACT DISCOVERY INTERROGATORIES**
(NO. 12)

21 Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant Google LLC
22 (“Google”) hereby objects and responds to Plaintiff Sonos, Inc.’s (“Sonos”) First Set of Fact
23 Discovery Interrogatories to Defendant (“Interrogatories”). Google responds to these
24 Interrogatories based on its current understanding and the information reasonably available to
25 Google at the present time. Google reserves the right to supplement these responses if and when
26 additional information becomes available.

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GENERAL OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES

1
2 1. These responses are made only for the purposes of discovery in this action. Each response
3 is subject to all appropriate objections as to competence, relevance, materiality, and any and all other
4 objections and grounds that would require the exclusion of any information, documents, or
5 statements contained in the responses if such information, documents, or statements were offered in
6 court. Google expressly reserves all such objections and may interpose them at the time of trial or
7 at any other time.

8 2. Google reserves all objections as to the admissibility at trial of any information or documents
9 identified in its responses to these Interrogatories. By identifying any document or supplying any
10 information, Google does not admit that such information or document is relevant to or admissible
11 in this litigation. Google reserves the right to object to further inquiry with respect to any subject
12 matter.

13 3. Google objects to the interrogatories, and to the definitions, to the extent that they purport
14 to impose any obligations upon Google beyond the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local
15 Rules of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.

16 4. Google objects to the definition of “Defendant,” “Google,” “You,” or “Your” on the grounds
17 that the definitions are overly broad, unduly burdensome, and vague, including but not limited to
18 the extent that they include: any Google parent, subsidiary, division, or related company; any
19 business entity controlled by or operated on behalf thereof; any predecessors thereof; and any and
20 all agents, directors, owners, officers, attorneys, employees, representatives, subcontracts, and/or
21 any person acting on its behalf.

22 5. Google objects to the definition of “Accused Cast-Enabled App(s)” on the grounds that the
23 definition is overly broad, unduly burdensome, and vague, including but not limited to the extent
24 that it includes: any Google Cast-enabled app other than the YouTube Music app, Google Play
25 Music app, YouTube app, Google Podcasts app, and YouTube TV app, and any third-party Cast-
26 enabled app that allows a user to “cast” to an Accused Cast-Enabled Media Player (including but
27 not limited to the Spotify app), and any Cast-enabled software (e.g., firmware and/or Cast-enabled
28 apps) executable on an Accused Cast-Enabled Display that enables a user to “[m]ove media from

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1 one cast device to another,” either collectively or individually. Google will respond with respect to
2 the YouTube Music app, Google Play Music app, YouTube app, Google Podcasts app, and YouTube
3 TV app.

4 6. Google objects to the definition of “Accused Google Product(s)” to the extent it includes
5 Sonos’s definition of the term “Accused Cast-Enabled App(s).”

6 7. Google objects to the definition of “Accused Google Server[s]” on the grounds that the
7 definition is overly broad, unduly burdensome, and vague, including but not limited to the extent
8 that it purports to include: any server that hosts at least one of the Accused Cast-Enabled App(s) for
9 download, any server that facilitates casting from Chromecast-enabled apps to Accused Cast-
10 Enabled Media Player(s), any server that facilitates moving media from one cast device to another,”
11 and any server that, in response to user input at any Accused Cast-Enabled App, facilitates delivering
12 media to an Accused Cast-Enabled Media Player (including but not limited to any Cloud Content
13 Delivery Network (CDN) server), either collectively or individually. Google will respond with
14 respect to the servers specifically accused in Sonos’s infringement contentions.

15 8. Google objects to the instructions regarding “identify,” “describe,” or “identity” in the
16 context of a person on the grounds that the instructions are overly broad, unduly burdensome, and
17 vague, including but not limited to the extent that they require inclusion of: the person’s present or
18 last known home address, business and e-mail addresses, and respective phone numbers; present or
19 last known place of employment and position; and his or her connection to the subject matter of the
20 interrogatory.

21 9. Google objects to the instructions to “identify,” “describe,” or specify the “identity” in the
22 context of a person who is a past or present director, officer, employee, agent, or representative of
23 Google on the grounds that the instructions are overly broad, unduly burdensome, and vague,
24 including but not limited to the extent that they require specification of: all positions or employments
25 held by that person with Google, and the dates between which each such position or employment
26 was held.

27 10. Google objects to the instructions to “identify,” “describe,” or specify the “identity” in the
28 context of an entity on the grounds that the instructions are overly broad, unduly burdensome, and

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1 vague, including but not limited to the extent that they require specification of: the entity’s place of
2 incorporation or other business organization; it’s principal places of business; its present or last
3 known mailing and physical address(es) and e-mail and website addresses; its present or last known
4 phone number; the type of entity or organization, its date and place of formation and any place(s) in
5 which it is registered to conduct business; its registered agent; and the identity of all individuals
6 employed by or acting for it at any time who have knowledge of the matter with respect to which
7 the entity is identified.

8 11. Google objects to the instructions to “identify,” “describe,” or specify the “identity” in the
9 context of a document on the grounds that the instructions are overly broad, unduly burdensome,
10 and vague, including but not limited to the extent that they require specification of: the date it was
11 authored, sent, and/or received; the identity of the author of the document; the identity of any
12 recipient of the document; and the identity of the custodian of the document.

13 12. Google objects to the instructions to “identify,” “describe,” or specify the “identity” in the
14 context of a communication on the grounds that the instructions are overly broad, unduly
15 burdensome, and vague, including but not limited to the extent that they require specification of: the
16 date it was authored, sent, and/or received; the identity of the author of the document; the identity
17 of any recipient of the document; and the identity of the custodian of the document. Google further
18 objects to the instructions regarding “identify,” “describe,” or “identity” in the context of a
19 communication to the extent that they suggest Google is required to search and produce
20 electronically stored information (ESI) before Sonos has shown good cause for ESI discovery, and
21 the parties have agreed on a procedure for doing so in accordance with the Court’s Standing Order.

22 13. Google objects to the instructions to “identify,” “describe,” or specify the “identity” in the
23 context of a thing on the grounds that the instructions are overly broad, unduly burdensome, and
24 vague, including but not limited to the extent that they require specification of: its physical
25 particulars; the day on which it was made; the identity of the persons who made it; the identity of
26 the persons who asked that it be made; its present condition; and its present location.

27 14. Google objects to the instructions to “state all facts” on the grounds that the instructions are
28 is overly broad, unduly burdensome, and vague, including but not limited to the extent that it

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1 requires specification of: the identification of any person or entity having knowledge of any such
2 fact, including the last known address and phone number and the identity of any document,
3 communication, or thing that refers, relates, or evidences any such fact.

4 15. Google objects to each interrogatory to the extent it seeks information protected by the
5 attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine or that is otherwise privileged or protected
6 from discovery.

7 16. Google objects to each interrogatory to the extent that it seeks information that is not relevant
8 to any claim or defense of any party or to the subject matter of this action, and is thus not
9 proportional to the needs of the case.

10 17. Google objects to each interrogatory to the extent it is compound and contains multiple
11 subparts.

12 18. Google objects to each interrogatory to the extent it is overbroad, unduly burdensome, vague,
13 and/or ambiguous.

14 19. Google objects to each interrogatory to the extent it seeks information that does not already
15 exist or that is not in Google’s possession, custody, or control.

16 20. Google objects to each interrogatory to the extent it requires Google to provide information
17 beyond what is available to Google at present from a reasonable search of its own files likely to
18 contain relevant or responsive documents and from a reasonable inquiry of its present employees.

19 21. Google objects to each interrogatory to the extent it seeks confidential or proprietary
20 information, including without limitation, confidential business information, proprietary and/or
21 competitively sensitive information, or trade secrets. Subject to its other General Objections, and
22 to any specific objections set forth below, Google will only provide relevant information in a manner
23 consistent with a Protective Order entered by the Court in this matter.

24 22. Google objects to each interrogatory to the extent it is unlimited in time or otherwise not
25 limited to a timeframe relevant to this litigation, and is therefore burdensome, oppressive, overly
26 broad, and not proportional to the needs of the case.

27 23. Google objects to each interrogatory to the extent it seeks a legal conclusion or expert
28 testimony.

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1 24. Google objects to each interrogatory to the extent it seeks information that is publicly
2 available and therefore as accessible to Sonos as to Google.

3 25. Google objects to each interrogatory to the extent that it is premature. Discovery is ongoing,
4 and Google has not yet completed its investigation of the matters at issue in this action. Google
5 reserves the right to modify, supplement, change or amend its responses after the Court has issued
6 its claim construction order, and once Google has conducted the necessary discovery and
7 investigation.

8 26. Google’s responses are not to be construed as an admission that any of the requested
9 information exists, that any information is admissible, relevant or proportional to the needs of the
10 case, or that any contention or assumption contained in the interrogatories, whether implicit or
11 explicit, is correct.

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HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY**OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO FACT DISCOVERY INTERROGATORIES****INTERROGATORY NO. 12:**

Separately for each Asserted Claim of each Patent-In-Suit, set forth in detail the complete legal and factual basis for any assertion by Google that the Accused Instrumentalities have not infringed each such claim, including, but not limited to: an identification of each Asserted Claim of each Patent-In-Suit that Google believes is not infringed; an identification of which elements of each such Asserted Claim are allegedly not present in the Accused Instrumentalities; and for each claim element that is allegedly not present in the Accused Instrumentalities, an identification and detailed explanation of the basis for Google’s assertion that the claim element is allegedly not present in the Accused Instrumentalities, including the basis for any assertion by Google that any differences between the claim element and the corresponding structure in the Accused Instrumentalities are not insubstantial and/or that the claim element and the corresponding structure in the Accused Instrumentalities do not perform substantially the same function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same result; and an identification of all facts supporting or refuting Google’s non-infringement allegations, all persons knowledgeable of these facts (including every person whose knowledge or opinion is relied upon as a basis for Google’s non-infringement assertions, the opinion or substance of his/her knowledge, and the entire basis of that knowledge or opinion), and all documents and things, including the Bates number(s) of such documents and things, concerning Google’s assertion of non-infringement.

OBJECTIONS: Google incorporates by reference all of its General Objections as if fully set forth herein. Google objects to the characterization of this interrogatory as a single interrogatory given that it contains multiple discrete subparts under Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(1). Google further objects to this interrogatory on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, unclear as to information sought, and lacking sufficient particularity to permit Google to reasonably prepare a response with respect to the undefined terms “differences between the claim element and the corresponding structure in the Accused Instrumentalities,” “insubstantial,” “do not perform substantially the same function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same result,” and “knowledgeable

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1 of.” Google further objects to this interrogatory on the grounds that it assumes the existence of
2 hypothetical facts that are incorrect or unknown to Google.

3 Google also objects to this interrogatory as overbroad, burdensome, and not proportional to
4 the needs of the case, including to the extent it (i) seeks information regarding “[s]eparately for each
5 Asserted Claim of each Patent-In-Suit,” (ii) seeks identification of “*all* persons knowledgeable” of
6 certain facts, and (iii) seeks “*all* documents things” concerning Google’s assertion of non-
7 infringement. Google further objects to this interrogatory as overbroad and unduly burdensome to
8 the extent that it seeks information that is publicly available, not uniquely within the control of
9 Google, or is equally available to Sonos. Google additionally objects to this interrogatory to the
10 extent it seeks communications and information protected from disclosure by the attorney-client
11 privilege and/or attorney work product doctrine. Google further objects to this interrogatory to the
12 extent it seeks confidential and/or proprietary business information. Google also objects to this
13 interrogatory to the extent that it premature seeks expert discovery, opinion, and/or
14 testimony. Google also objects to this interrogatory on the grounds that it seeks information that is
15 obtainable through less burdensome and more convenient forms of discovery.

16 Google further objects to this interrogatory to the extent that it is premature insofar as it
17 seeks expert testimony before expert discovery. Google further objects to this interrogatory to the
18 extent it improperly attempts to shift the burden of proving infringement, which belongs to Sonos,
19 not Google. Google further objects to this interrogatory to the extent it purports to seek ESI before
20 Sonos has shown good cause for such ESI and before the parties have agreed on a procedure for
21 doing so in accordance with the Court’s OGP.

22 **RESPONSE:**

23 Subject to and without waiving the foregoing General and Specific objections, Google
24 responds, as follows:

25 Google objects to this interrogatory on the grounds that it is premature, improperly seeks
26 expert testimony, and improperly attempts to shift the burden to Google. Sonos has failed to meet
27 its burden to serve infringement contentions that provide Google adequate notice of Sonos’s
28 infringement theories and claims for infringement, and thus Google lacks sufficient information to

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1 reasonably prepare a response to this interrogatory. Further, Sonos has yet to serve its Final
 2 Invalidity Contentions, and, to the extent Sonos’s infringement contentions provide additional
 3 notice of Sonos’s infringement theories Google anticipates that it will identify additional reasons
 4 why the accused products do not infringe. Nevertheless, based on Google’s current understanding
 5 of the asserted claims, the Accused Instrumentalities do not infringe for at least the following
 6 reasons.

Representative Products

8 As an initial matter, Sonos improperly alleges that a wide variety of devices and applications
 9 infringe because they implement “‘Cast’ technology.” Sonos does not provide notice of its theory
 10 of infringement for each accused product specifically, however, and does not provide any evidence
 11 that the numerous accused products that it is accusing operate in materially the same way. Sonos’s
 12 patchwork analysis pulling together numerous different products under a vague assertion that they
 13 implement “‘Cast technology” is incomplete and fails to meet Sonos’s burden to show that each of
 14 the accused products infringes the Asserted Claims of the Asserted Patents as a matter of law. *L &*
 15 *W, Inc. v. Shertech, Inc.*, 471 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding plaintiff failed to demonstrate
 16 infringement because “Shertech cannot simply ‘assume’ that all of L & W’s products are like the
 17 one Dr. Holmes tested and thereby shift to L & W the burden to show that is not the case”).

’615 Patent.

19 *Claim 1.* The Accused Instrumentalities do not infringe claim 1 because Sonos has not met
 20 its burden of proof to show that any of the limitations of claim 1 are satisfied. Additionally, the
 21 Accused Instrumentalities also do not infringe claim 1 because they do not contain or perform at
 22 least the following limitations of the claim:

- 23 • “detecting, via the control device, a set of inputs to transfer playback from the control
 24 device to a particular playback device, wherein the set of inputs comprises: (i) a selection
 25 of the selectable option for transferring playback from the control device and (ii) a
 26 selection of the particular playback device from the identified playback devices
 27 connected to the local area network”

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- “after detecting the set of inputs to transfer playback from the control device to the particular playback device, causing playback to be transferred from the control device to the particular playback device, wherein transferring playback from the control device to the particular playback device comprises: (a) causing one or more first cloud servers to add multimedia content to a local playback queue on the particular playback device, wherein adding the multimedia content to the local playback queue comprises the one or more first cloud servers adding, to the local playback queue, one or more resource locators corresponding to respective locations of the multimedia content at one or more second cloud servers of a streaming content service; (b) causing playback at the control device to be stopped; and (c) modifying the one or more transport controls of the control interface to control playback by the playback device.”

Claim 13. The Accused Instrumentalities do not infringe claim 13 because Sonos has not met its burden of proof to show that any of the limitations of claim 13 are satisfied. Additionally, the Accused Instrumentalities also do not infringe claim 13 because they do not contain or perform at least the following limitations of the claim:

- after connecting to a local area network via a network interface, identifying playback devices connected to the local area network;
- detecting a set of inputs to transfer playback from the control device to a particular playback device, wherein the set of inputs comprises: (i) a selection of the selectable option for transferring playback from the control device and (ii) a selection of the particular playback device from the identified playback devices connected to the local area network
- after detecting the set of inputs to transfer playback from the control device to the particular playback device, causing playback to be transferred from the control device to the particular playback device, wherein transferring playback from the control device to the particular playback device comprises: (a) causing one or more first cloud servers to add multimedia content to a local playback queue on the particular playback device, wherein adding the multimedia content to the local playback queue comprises the one or

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1 more first cloud servers adding, to the local playback queue, one or more resource
 2 locators corresponding to respective locations of the multimedia content at one or more
 3 second cloud servers of a streaming content service; (b) causing playback at the control
 4 device to be stopped; and (c) modifying the one or more transport controls of the control
 5 interface to control playback by the playback device

6 *Claim 25.* The Accused Instrumentalities do not infringe claim 25 because Sonos has not
 7 met its burden of proof to show that any of the limitations of claim 25 are satisfied. Additionally,
 8 the Accused Instrumentalities also do not infringe claim 25 because they do not contain or perform
 9 at least the following limitations of the claim:

- 10 • after connecting to a local area network via the wireless communication interface,
 11 identifying playback devices connected to the local area network;
- 12 • detecting a set of inputs to transfer playback from the control device to a particular
 13 playback device, wherein the set of inputs comprises: (i) a selection of the selectable
 14 option for transferring playback from the control device and (ii) a selection of the
 15 particular playback device from the identified playback devices connected to the local
 16 area network
- 17 • after detecting the set of inputs to transfer playback from the control device to the
 18 particular playback device, causing playback to be transferred from the control device to
 19 the particular playback device, wherein transferring playback from the control device to
 20 the particular playback device comprises: (a) causing one or more first cloud servers to
 21 add multimedia content to a local playback queue on the particular playback device,
 22 wherein adding the multimedia content to the local playback queue comprises the one or
 23 more first cloud servers adding, to the local playback queue, one or more resource
 24 locators corresponding to respective locations of the multimedia content at one or more
 25 second cloud servers of a streaming content service; (b) causing playback at the control
 26 device to be stopped; and (c) modifying the one or more transport controls of the control
 27 interface to control playback by the playback device

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1 *Dependent Claims.* The Accused Instrumentalities do not infringe the dependent claims for
 2 at least the same reasons as set forth with respect to the independent claims above.

3 **'033 Patent.**

4 *Claim 1.* The Accused Instrumentalities do not infringe claim 1 because Sonos has not met
 5 its burden of proof to show that any of the limitations of claim 1 are satisfied. Additionally, the
 6 Accused Instrumentalities also do not infringe claim 1 because they do not contain or perform at
 7 least the following limitations of the claim:

- 8 • operating in a first mode in which the computing device is configured for playback of a
 9 remote playback queue provided by a cloud-based computing system associated with a
 10 cloud-based media service
- 11 • while operating in the first mode, displaying a representation of one or more playback
 12 devices in a media playback system that are each i) communicatively coupled to the
 13 computing device over a data network and ii) available to accept playback responsibility
 14 for the remote playback queue
- 15 • based on receiving the user input, transmitting an instruction for the at least one given
 16 playback device to take over responsibility for playback of the remote playback queue
 17 from the computing device, wherein the instruction configures the at least one given
 18 playback device to (i) communicate with the cloud-based computing system in order to
 19 obtain data identifying a next one or more media items that are in the remote playback
 20 queue, (ii) use the obtained data to retrieve at least one media item in the remote playback
 21 queue from the cloud-based media service; and (iii) play back the retrieved at least one
 22 media item;
- 23 • detecting an indication that playback responsibility for the remote playback queue has
 24 been successfully transferred from the computing device to the at least one given
 25 playback device
- 26 • after detecting the indication, transitioning from i) the first mode in which the computing
 27 device is configured for playback of the remote playback queue to ii) a second mode in
 28 which the computing device is configured to control the at least one given playback

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1 device's playback of the remote playback queue and the computing device is no longer
2 configured for playback of the remote playback queue

3 *Claim 11.* The Accused Instrumentalities do not infringe claim 11 because Sonos has not
4 met its burden of proof to show that any of the limitations of claim 11 are satisfied. Additionally,
5 the Accused Instrumentalities also do not infringe claim 11 because they do not contain or perform
6 at least the following limitations of the claim:

- 7 • operating in a first mode in which the computing device is configured for playback of a
8 remote playback queue provided by a cloud-based computing system associated with a
9 cloud-based media service
- 10 • while operating in the first mode, displaying a representation of one or more playback
11 devices in a media playback system that are each i) communicatively coupled to the
12 computing device over a data network and ii) available to accept playback responsibility
13 for the remote playback queue
- 14 • based on receiving the user input, transmitting an instruction for the at least one given
15 playback device to take over responsibility for playback of the remote playback queue
16 from the computing device, wherein the instruction configures the at least one given
17 playback device to (i) communicate with the cloud-based computing system in order to
18 obtain data identifying a next one or more media items that are in the remote playback
19 queue, (ii) use the obtained data to retrieve at least one media item in the remote playback
20 queue from the cloud-based media service; and (iii) play back the retrieved at least one
21 media item
- 22 • detecting an indication that playback responsibility for the remote playback queue has
23 been successfully transferred from the computing device to the at least one given
24 playback device
- 25 • after detecting the indication, transitioning from i) the first mode in which the computing
26 device is configured for playback of the remote playback queue to ii) a second mode in
27 which the computing device is configured to control the at least one given playback
28

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1 device's playback of the remote playback queue and the computing device is no longer
2 configured for playback of the remote playback queue

3 *Claim 15.* The Accused Instrumentalities do not infringe claim 15 because Sonos has not
4 met its burden of proof to show that any of the limitations of claim 15 are satisfied. Additionally,
5 the Accused Instrumentalities also do not infringe claim 15 because they do not contain or perform
6 at least the following limitations of the claim:

- 7 • operating in a first mode in which the computing device is configured for playback of a
8 remote playback queue provided by a cloud-based computing system associated with a
9 cloud-based media service
- 10 • while operating in the first mode, displaying a representation of one or more playback
11 devices in a media playback system that are each i) communicatively coupled to the
12 computing device over a data network and ii) available to accept playback responsibility
13 for the remote playback queue
- 14 • based on receiving the user input, transmitting an instruction for the at least one given
15 playback device to take over responsibility for playback of the remote playback queue
16 from the computing device, wherein the instruction configures the at least one given
17 playback device to (i) communicate with the cloud-based computing system in order to
18 obtain data identifying a next one or more media items that are in the remote playback
19 queue, (ii) use the obtained data to retrieve at least one media item in the remote playback
20 queue from the cloud-based media service; and (iii) play back the retrieved at least one
21 media item
- 22 • detecting an indication that playback responsibility for the remote playback queue has
23 been successfully transferred from the computing device to the at least one given
24 playback device
- 25 • after detecting the indication, transitioning from i) the first mode in which the computing
26 device is configured for playback of the remote playback queue to ii) a second mode in
27 which the computing device is configured to control the at least one given playback
28

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1 device's playback of the remote playback queue and the computing device is no longer
 2 configured for playback of the remote playback queue

3 *Dependent Claims.* The Accused Instrumentalities do not infringe the dependent claims for
 4 at least the same reasons as set forth with respect to the independent claims above.

'966 Patent

6 *Claim 1.* The Accused Instrumentalities do not infringe claim 1 because Sonos has not met
 7 its burden of proof to show that any of the limitations of claim 1 are satisfied. Additionally, the
 8 Accused Instrumentalities also do not infringe claim 1 because they do not contain or perform at
 9 least the following limitations of the claim:

- 10 • A computing device
- 11 • receiving a first request to create a first zone scene comprising a first predefined grouping
- 12 of zone players including at least the first zone player and a second zone player that are
- 13 to be configured for synchronous playback of media when the first zone scene is invoked
- 14 • based on the first request, i) causing creation of the first zone scene, ii) causing an
- 15 indication of the first zone scene to be transmitted to the first zone player, and iii) causing
- 16 storage of the first zone scene
- 17 • receiving a second request to create a second zone scene comprising a second predefined
- 18 grouping of zone players including at least the first zone player and a third zone player
- 19 that are to be configured for synchronous playback of media when the second zone scene
- 20 is invoked, wherein the third zone player is different than the second zone player
- 21 • based on the second request, i) causing creation of the second zone scene, ii) causing an
- 22 indication of the second zone scene to be transmitted to the first zone player, and iii)
- 23 causing storage of the second zone scene; displaying a representation of the first zone
- 24 scene and a representation of the second zone scene; and while displaying the
- 25 representation of the first zone scene and the representation of the second zone scene,
- 26 receiving a third request to invoke the first zone scene
- 27 • based on the third request, causing the first zone player to transition from operating in
- 28 the standalone mode to operating in accordance with the first predefined grouping of

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1 zone players such that the first zone player is configured to coordinate with at least the
2 second zone player to output media in synchrony with output of media by at least the
3 second zone player

4 *Claim 9.* The Accused Instrumentalities do not infringe claim 9 because Sonos has not met
5 its burden of proof to show that any of the limitations of claim 9 are satisfied. Additionally, the
6 Accused Instrumentalities also do not infringe claim 9 because they do not contain or perform at
7 least the following limitations of the claim:

- 8 • receiving a first request to create a first zone scene comprising a first predefined grouping
9 of zone players including at least the first zone player and a second zone player that are
10 to be configured for synchronous playback of media when the first zone scene is invoked
- 11 • based on the first request, i) causing creation of the first zone scene, ii) causing an
12 indication of the first zone scene to be transmitted to the first zone player, and iii) causing
13 storage of the first zone scene
- 14 • receiving a second request to create a second zone scene comprising a second predefined
15 grouping of zone players including at least the first zone player and a third zone player
16 that are to be configured for synchronous playback of media when the second zone scene
17 is invoked, wherein the third zone player is different than the second zone player
- 18 • based on the second request, i) causing creation of the second zone scene, ii) causing an
19 indication of the second zone scene to be transmitted to the first zone player, and iii)
20 causing storage of the second zone scene
- 21 • displaying a representation of the first zone scene and a representation of the second zone
22 scene
- 23 • while displaying the representation of the first zone scene and the representation of the
24 second zone scene, receiving a third request to invoke the first zone scene
- 25 • based on the third request, causing the first zone player to transition from operating in
26 the standalone mode to operating in accordance with the first predefined grouping of
27 zone players such that the first zone player is configured to coordinate with at least the
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1 second zone player to output media in synchrony with output of media by at least the
 2 second zone player

3 *Claim 17.* The Accused Instrumentalities do not infringe claim 17 because Sonos has not
 4 met its burden of proof to show that any of the limitations of claim 17 are satisfied. Additionally,
 5 the Accused Instrumentalities also do not infringe claim 17 because they do not contain or perform
 6 at least the following limitations of the claim:

- 7 • receiving a first request to create a first zone scene comprising a first predefined grouping
 8 of zone players including at least the first zone player and a second zone player that are
 9 to be configured for synchronous playback of media when the first zone scene is invoked
- 10 • based on the first request, i) causing creation of the first zone scene, ii) causing an
 11 indication of the first zone scene to be transmitted to the first zone player, and iii) causing
 12 storage of the first zone scene
- 13 • receiving a second request to create a second zone scene comprising a second predefined
 14 grouping of zone players including at least the first zone player and a third zone player
 15 that are to be configured for synchronous playback of media when the second zone scene
 16 is invoked, wherein the third zone player is different than the second zone player
- 17 • based on the second request, i) causing creation of the second zone scene, ii) causing an
 18 indication of the second zone scene to be transmitted to the first zone player, and iii)
 19 causing storage of the second zone scene
- 20 • displaying a representation of the first zone scene and a representation of the second zone
 21 scene
- 22 • while displaying the representation of the first zone scene and the representation of the
 23 second zone scene, receiving a third request to invoke the first zone scene; and based on
 24 the third request, causing the first zone player to transition from operating in the
 25 standalone mode to operating in accordance with the first predefined grouping of zone
 26 players such that the first zone player is configured to coordinate with at least the second
 27 zone player to output media in synchrony with output of media by at least the second
 28 zone player

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1 *Dependent Claims.* The Accused Instrumentalities do not infringe the dependent claims for
2 at least the same reasons as set forth with respect to the independent claims above.

3 **'885 Patent**

4 *Claim 1.* The Accused Instrumentalities do not infringe claim 1 because Sonos has not met
5 its burden of proof to show that any of the limitations of claim 1 are satisfied. Additionally, the
6 Accused Instrumentalities also do not infringe claim 1 because they do not contain or perform at
7 least the following limitations of the claim:

- 8 • while operating in a standalone mode in which the first zone player is configured to play
9 back media individually in a networked media playback system comprising the first zone
10 player and at least two other zone players: (i) receiving, from a network device over a
11 data network, a first indication that the first zone player has been added to a first zone
12 scene comprising a first predefined grouping of zone players including at least the first
13 zone player and a second zone player that are to be configured for synchronous playback
14 of media when the first zone scene is invoked; and (ii) receiving, from the network device
15 over the data network, a second indication that the first zone player has been added to a
16 second zone scene comprising a second predefined grouping of zone players including
17 at least the first zone player and a third zone player that are to be configured for
18 synchronous playback of media when the second zone scene is invoked, wherein the
19 second zone player is different than the third zone player
- 20 • after receiving the first and second indications, continuing to operate in the standalone
21 mode until a given one of the first and second zone scenes has been selected for
22 invocation;
- 23 • after the given one of the first and second zone scenes has been selected for invocation,
24 receiving, from the network device over the data network, an instruction to operate in
25 accordance with a given one of the first and second zone scenes respectively comprising
26 a given one of the first and second predefined groupings of zone players;
- 27 • based on the instruction, transitioning from operating in the standalone mode to
28 operating in accordance with the given one of the first and second predefined groupings

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1 of zone players such that the first zone player is configured to coordinate with at least
 2 one other zone player in the given one of the first and second predefined groupings of
 3 zone players over a data network in order to output media in synchrony with output of
 4 media by the at least one other zone player in the given one of the first and second
 5 predefined groupings of zone players

6 *Claim 8.* The Accused Instrumentalities do not infringe claim 8 because Sonos has not met
 7 its burden of proof to show that any of the limitations of claim 8 are satisfied. Additionally, the
 8 Accused Instrumentalities also do not infringe claim 8 because they do not contain or perform at
 9 least the following limitations of the claim:

- 10 • while operating in a standalone mode in which the first zone player is configured to play
 11 back media individually in a networked media playback system comprising the first zone
 12 player and at least two other zone players: (i) receiving, from a network device over a
 13 data network, a first indication that the first zone player has been added to a first zone
 14 scene comprising a first predefined grouping of zone players including at least the first
 15 zone player and a second zone player that are to be configured for synchronous playback
 16 of media when the first zone scene is invoked; and (ii) receiving, from the network device
 17 over the data network, a second indication that the first zone player has been added to a
 18 second zone scene comprising a second predefined grouping of zone players including
 19 at least the first zone player and a third zone player that are to be configured for
 20 synchronous playback of media when the second zone scene is invoked, wherein the
 21 second zone player is different than the third zone player
- 22 • after receiving the first and second indications, continuing to operate in the standalone
 23 mode until a given one of the first and second zone scenes has been selected for
 24 invocation
- 25 • after the given one of the first and second zone scenes has been selected for invocation,
 26 receiving, from the network device over the data network, an instruction to operate in
 27 accordance with a given one of the first and second zone scenes respectively comprising
 28 a given one of the first and second predefined groupings of zone players

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- based on the instruction, transitioning from operating in the standalone mode to operating in accordance with the given one of the first and second predefined groupings of zone players such that the first zone player is configured to coordinate with at least one other zone player in the given one of the first and second predefined groupings of zone players over a data network in order to output media in synchrony with output of media by the at least one other zone player in the given one of the first and second predefined groupings of zone players

Claim 15. The Accused Instrumentalities do not infringe claim 15 because Sonos has not met its burden of proof to show that any of the limitations of claim 15 are satisfied. Additionally, the Accused Instrumentalities also do not infringe claim 15 because they do not contain or perform at least the following limitations of the claim:

- while operating in a standalone mode in which the first zone player is configured to play back media individually in a networked media playback system comprising the first zone player and at least two other zone players: (i) receiving, from a network device over a data network, a first indication that the first zone player has been added to a first zone scene comprising a first predefined grouping of zone players including at least the first zone player and a second zone player that are to be configured for synchronous playback of media when the first zone scene is invoked; and (ii) receiving, from the network device over the data network, a second indication that the first zone player has been added to a second zone scene comprising a second predefined grouping of zone players including at least the first zone player and a third zone player that are to be configured for synchronous playback of media when the second zone scene is invoked, wherein the second zone player is different than the third zone player
- after receiving the first and second indications, continuing to operate in the standalone mode until a given one of the first and second zone scenes has been selected for invocation
- after the given one of the first and second zone scenes has been selected for invocation, receiving, from the network device over the data network, an instruction to operate in

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1 accordance with a given one of the first and second zone scenes respectively comprising
2 a given one of the first and second predefined groupings of zone players

- 3 • based on the instruction, transitioning from operating in the standalone mode to
4 operating in accordance with the given one of the first and second predefined groupings
5 of zone players such that the first zone player is configured to coordinate with at least
6 one other zone player in the given one of the first and second predefined groupings of
7 zone players over a data network in order to output media in synchrony with output of
8 media by the at least one other zone player in the given one of the first and second
9 predefined groupings of zone players

10 *Dependent Claims.* The Accused Instrumentalities do not infringe the dependent claims for
11 at least the same reasons as set forth with respect to the independent claims above.

FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE:

13 Subject to and without waiving the foregoing General and Specific objections, Google
14 further responds, as follows:

15 Google objects to the term “Accused Instrumentalities” to the extent it purports to include
16 instrumentalities Sonos has not identified by name or model number in its infringement contentions,
17 or for which Sonos has not provided Google with its infringement theories. For example, Google
18 objects to the term to the extent it purports to include the Podcast application, which Sonos is no
19 longer accusing of infringement. Google also objects to the term to the extent it purports to include
20 the Spotify application, which Sonos is no longer accusing of infringement.

21 Sonos’s infringement contentions are also incoherent, vague, and ambiguous, and it is
22 accordingly difficult, if not impossible, for Google to understand Plaintiff's theories of
23 infringement. Google has detailed issues in Sonos’s infringement contentions in correspondence
24 among the parties, including its November 2, 2021 letter, and Sonos has continued to fail to remedy
25 them. Sonos has also vaguely asserted that certain terms should be construed as “plain and ordinary
26 meaning,” while at the same time refusing to explain what it contends is the plain and ordinary
27 meaning of the term. Google has accordingly used its own constructions of the disputed terms in
28

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1 addressing this Interrogatory, as well as those adopted by the Texas court prior to transfer. Google
 2 reserves the right to supplement its response after the Court renders its claim constructions.

3 ***Representative Products***

4 As an initial matter, Sonos improperly lumps together a number of different YouTube
 5 applications. Sonos does not provide notice of its theory of infringement for each YouTube
 6 application, and Sonos has not shown that any of these products are representative of
 7 another. Sonos’s patchwork analysis pulling together numerous different YouTube applications
 8 without any showing that they operate in the same way is incomplete and fails to meet Sonos’s
 9 burden to show that each of the accused products infringes the Asserted Claims of the Asserted
 10 Patents as a matter of law. *L & W, Inc. v. Shertech, Inc.*, 471 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding
 11 plaintiff failed to demonstrate infringement because “Shertech cannot simply ‘assume’ that all of L
 12 & W’s products are like the one Dr. Holmes tested and thereby shift to L & W the burden to show
 13 that is not the case”). The different YouTube applications support different features and
 14 functionalities, including with respect to the functionality Sonos has accused. By way of example
 15 only, Sonos accuses functionality related to YouTube’s AutoPlay feature (*e.g.*, the use of an
 16 “upNextVideoID”), which is a feature that is not available in certain YouTube Applications (*e.g.*,
 17 YouTube Music). It is Sonos, not Google’s, burden to show *each* YouTube application infringes,
 18 and Sonos’s attempt to lump together these various applications is insufficient to meet its burden.

19 **CIA**

20 Further, Google does not infringe because the parties’ 2013 Content Integration
 21 Agreement (“CIA”) applies to Sonos’s claims. Sonos’s infringement allegations for the ‘615 and
 22 ‘033 patents appear to be directed at Google technologies that arise out of or are related to work
 23 done by Google as part of the Google-Sonos collaboration. For example, Sonos has referred to the
 24 ‘615 and ‘033 patents as “cloud queue patents.” Dkt. 32-1 at 17:3-8. At the same time that the
 25 Content Integration Agreement was signed, in November 2013, Google told Sonos that it was
 26 considering “a more cloud queue centric model” for certain aspects of development related to the
 27 collaboration. “Tad” Coburn, then a Principal Software Engineer at Sonos, acknowledged Google’s
 28 idea as “very interesting,” while noting that it “will definitely complicate things.” Dkt. 33 at 23-

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24. Google went on to develop its technology, and the details of Google’s development work were known to Sonos at the time in connection with the parties’ collaboration. *See, e.g.*, GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00037146-00037164; GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00043682-00043700; GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00051100-00051118; GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00037042-00037080; GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00043637-00043675; GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00051055-00051093; GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00036998-00037003; GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00043676-00043681; GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00051094-00051099; GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00037141-00037145; GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00037004-00037008; GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00037165-00037177; GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00050985-00050997; GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00037231-00037242; GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00050422-00050433; GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00040342-00040382; GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00043736-00043738; GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00051461-00051463; GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00037178-00037180; GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00037313-00037315; GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00037181-00037217; GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00037316-00037352; GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00037220-00037222; GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00037355-00037357; GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00037223; GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00037358; GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00037224-00037230. Sonos also understood – and acknowledged at the time – that Google would be using its technology not just in connection with Sonos devices but also in connection with other devices.

Nevertheless, Sonos has accused Google of infringing the ‘615 and ‘033 patents in violation of the CIA. Specifically, the CIA provides that work done by or on behalf of Google as part of the collaboration – and any intellectual property rights arising out of or related to that work – would be the sole and exclusive property of Google:

3.4. Ownership of Service Provider Intellectual Property Rights. The Music Service, the Provider Developments (as defined below), and any and all intellectual property rights arising from or related thereto are and shall remain the sole and exclusive property of Service Provider. Sonos will not claim for itself or for any third party any right, title, interest or licenses to the Music Service or Provider Developments, except for the limited license granted herein. The Provider Developments consist of any and all development work done by or on behalf of Service Provider in creating the Integrated Service Offering, and any code or other materials owned or controlled by Service Provider and included by Service Provider in the Integrated Service Offering, excluding the Licensed Software, under the terms of the Development Agreement.

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CIA § 3.4. The “intellectual property rights” described in Section 3.4 cover work done by or on behalf of Google as part of the collaboration, including but not limited to work done by or on behalf of Google on the functionality that Sonos accuses of infringing the ‘615 and ‘033 patents, as well as work arising from or related to such work.

‘615 Patent & ‘033 Patent***Alleged Direct Infringement By Google***

Sonos’s allegation of direct infringement by Google are the same for the ‘615 and ‘033 patents in its infringement contentions. Accordingly, Google addresses the allegations together in this response.

Sonos accuses Google of directly infringing by “offering to sell, selling, and/or importing into the United States its “Pixel” brand of Cast-enabled computing devices, as well as its Cast-enabled displays, in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).” However, Sonos has not provided any evidence that Pixel devices include the accused YouTube applications or Google Play Music applications that Sonos contends are necessary for infringement when offered for sale, sold or imported in the United States.

Sonos also purports to identify numerous third-party devices in an Appendix 1 to the infringement contentions. Sonos has not provided any evidence that Google offers to sell, sells or imports into the United States any or all of the devices in Appendix 1. Nor has Sonos shown that any or all of these devices are even capable of including the accused YouTube and Google Play Music application. For example, Sonos has not provided any evidence that Google offers to sell, sells or imports into the United States any Arirang (North Korean) devices, or Yota (Russian device), or that these North Korean and Russian devices are even capable of including the accused YouTube and Google Play Music applications.

Sonos further alleges that Google infringes the asserted claims “by virtue of installing one or more of the accused Cast-enabled apps onto Cast-enabled computing devices and installing Cast-enabled software (*e.g.*, firmware updates and/or Cast-enabled apps) onto Cast-enabled displays within the United States, which constitutes ‘mak[ing]’ an infringing device under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).” But Sonos has not provided any evidence that Google installs the accused applications

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1 onto the accused computing devices. Nor has Sonos shown that any updates (*e.g.*, firmware updates)
2 would include the accused functionality. Accordingly, Sonos has not shown any “making” of an
3 infringing device by Google.

4 Sonos further alleges that Google infringes the asserted claims “by virtue of testing Cast-
5 enabled computing devices and testing Cast-enabled displays within the United States, which
6 constitutes ‘us[ing]’ an infringing device under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).” Again, Sonos has failed to
7 produce any evidence or identify any instance in which Google has tested or used the devices in the
8 manner that is accused of infringing the asserted ’615 patent. Nor has Sonos provided any evidence
9 that the damages theories that it has disclosed in its Damages Contentions are tied to any internal
10 use or testing by Google.

11 Sonos additionally alleges that Google infringes “certain asserted claims of the ’615 and
12 ’033 Patents (*e.g.*, claims 13-15, 18-21, and 23-24 of the ’615 Patent and claims 12-13 of the ’033
13 Patent)” because allegedly “Google operates servers in the United States that host Cast-enabled apps
14 for download onto Cast-enabled computing devices and/or Cast-enabled software (*e.g.*, firmware
15 and/or Cast-enabled apps) for download onto Cast-enabled displays.” The claims at issue recite a
16 “computer-readable media having instructions encoded therein” that when executed perform certain
17 functional steps. Sonos has not provided any evidence that Google’s servers have performed the
18 method steps in these claims, or that they are capable of doing so. In fact, Google’s computer servers
19 do not include a computer readable media with instructions that can be executed to perform the steps
20 of the claims. For example, Google’s servers are not the claimed “computing device” that is
21 “operating in a first mode in which the computing device is configured for playback of a remote
22 playback queue” (’033 patent) or the claimed “control device” (’615 patent), do not connect to a
23 local area network, do not have a graphical user interface or display, do not allow selection of a
24 particular playback device, cannot transfer playback of a local or remote playback queue, cannot
25 display or modify transport controls, and cannot play or stop playback of multimedia content. Sonos
26 has also accused computing devices and playback devices that are not provided by Google such that
27 Google would not directly infringe these claims. Accordingly, Sonos has failed to show that Google
28 directly infringes these claims. *See Deep9 Corp. v. Barnes & Noble, Inc.*, No. C11-0035JLR, 2012

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1 WL 4336726 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 21, 2012) (computer readable media claim not infringe where
2 accused infringer did not provide the “common communications channel” limitation because the
3 product guide and terms of service specified “that it is the user’s choice as to what internet service
4 provider to use”).

5 ***Alleged Indirect Infringement By Google***

6 Google contends that it has not (1) contributed to the direct infringement of the Asserted
7 Claims (contributory infringement); or (2) induced any third party to infringe the Asserted Claims
8 directly (induced infringement). Initially, this Court recently granted Google’s motion to dismiss
9 Sonos’s indirect infringement claims with respect to the ’033, ’966, and ’885 patents because Sonos
10 has not shown that Google had notice of the patents pre-suit, a specific intent to infringe those
11 patents, or that there were components with no substantial non-infringing uses. Thus, Google
12 contends that Sonos’s indirect infringement allegations for at least the ’033, ’966 and ’885 patent
13 are deficient for at least these reasons and have been dismissed from the case.

14 Additionally, contributory infringement requires that an alleged infringer, with knowledge
15 of the patent, sells, offers to sells, and/or imports into the U.S. a material part or component of the
16 invention, knowing that it is especially made or adapted for infringement, and not a staple article or
17 commodity suitable for substantial non-infringing use. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). “For purposes of
18 contributory infringement, the [substantial noninfringing use] inquiry focuses on whether the
19 accused products can be used for purposes other than infringement.” *In re Bill of Lading*
20 *Transmission and Processing Sys. Patent Litig.*, 681 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Here,
21 Accused Products, and components thereof, have substantial non-infringing uses. For example, the
22 ’033 and ’615 patents claim a “computing device,” which Sonos has mapped to a smartphone, tablet,
23 or other computing device. The accused computing devices can be used for many functionalities
24 that are not even related to playback of media, such as making phone calls, browsing the Internet,
25 sending email communications, and numerous other functionalities. Sonos also allege that Google
26 infringes the Asserted Patents vis-à-vis the casting functionality in the YouTube and Google Play
27 Music applications, but each application can be used without the casting functionality, and Sonos
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1 has failed to show an application is the claimed component. Thus, any and all components of the
 2 Accused Products have substantial non-infringing uses.

3 With respect to induced infringement, Google has not, with knowledge of the patent and
 4 infringement thereof, actively induced its customers or end-users to infringe the Asserted Patents
 5 with specific intent to encourage infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b); *see Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco*
 6 *Sys., Inc.*, 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1928 (2015). Sonos has not identified any evidence that Google actively
 7 induced customers or end-users to infringe or that Google did so with the specific intent to encourage
 8 infringement. There is no evidence that Google knew of the alleged infringement; in fact, Sonos
 9 admits that Google did not have knowledge of the ’033, ’966, and ’885 patents until just hours
 10 before the filing of the action. Accordingly, there is no evidence suggesting that Google took actions
 11 with the specific intent to encourage any infringement.

12 Google provides a further response on an element by element basis below for each of the
 13 Asserted Patents.

Alleged Infringement Under Section 271(f)

14 In order to be liable for infringement under § 271(f), a defendant must “suppl[y]”
 15 components of a patented invention “in or from the United States” with the intent that they will be
 16 “combined outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such
 17 combination occurred within the United States.” *See* § 271(f)(1)-(2). Google does not supply
 18 components of a patented invention in or from the United States in this fashion.

19 In particular, as applied to software, the Supreme Court has held that a “component” must
 20 be something physical, and since “[a]bstract software code is an idea without physical embodiment
 21 . . . it does not match § 271(f)’s categorization: ‘components’ amenable to
 22 ‘combination.’” *Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.*, 550 U.S. 437, 447-49 (2007). Following
 23 *Microsoft*, district courts have dismissed § 271(f) claims centered on software in the abstract. *See*
 24 *e.g., People.ai, Inc. v. SetSail Techs., Inc.*, No. C 20-09148 WHA, 2021 WL 2333880, at *6 (N.D.
 25 Cal. June 8, 2021) (Alsup, J.) (“software in the abstract can be neither a component, as required
 26 by Section 271(f)”); *see also CIF Licensing, LLC v. Agere Sys. Inc.*, 727 F. Supp. 2d 337, 352 (D.
 27 Del. 2010) (granting motion for judgment as a matter of law to defendant on 271(f) because “no
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1 reasonable jury could infer . . . that Defendant’s software was formatted as a computer-readable
 2 copy, rather than abstract software code”).

3 Sonos has accused certain Google applications of infringing the ‘615 and ‘033
 4 patents. However, Google does not supply any physical embodiment associated with those
 5 applications “in or from the United States.” Accordingly, because the Supreme Court has held that
 6 a “component” must be something physical and “[a]bstract software code is an idea without physical
 7 embodiment” (*Microsoft*, 550 U.S. at 447-49), Section 271(f) does not apply.

’615 Patent***YouTube Applications*****’615 Patent, Claim 13**

11 **“after detecting the set of inputs to transfer playback from the control device to the**
 12 **particular playback device, causing playback to be transferred from the control device to the**
 13 **particular playback device.”** Sonos’s contentions fails to demonstrate that this limitation is
 14 satisfied. The YouTube application running on the control device does not cause playback to be
 15 transferred from the control device to the particular playback device. As Sonos’s own contentions
 16 acknowledge, at most, the YouTube application may transmit a “setPlaylist” message “to one or
 17 more MDx servers.” Sonos’s Infringement Contention, Ex. A at 37. The MDx servers then generate
 18 a further set Playlist message “requesting the screen to start playing the video identified by the
 19 videoID from the currentTime.” *See, e.g.*, GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00041650 at 57. Thus, it is the
 20 MDx server, not the control device, that causes playback to be transferred to the particular playback
 21 device.

22 **“wherein transferring playback from the control device to the particular playback**
 23 **device comprises: causing one or more first cloud servers to add multimedia content to a local**
 24 **playback queue on the particular playback device, wherein adding the multimedia content to**
 25 **the local playback queue comprises the one or more first cloud servers adding, to the local**
 26 **playback queue, one or more resource locators corresponding to respective locations of the**
 27 **multimedia content at one or more second cloud servers of a streaming content**
 28 **service.”** Sonos’s contentions fails to demonstrate that this limitation is satisfied for many reasons.

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1 For example, Sonos appears to contend that audio alone may be the claimed “multimedia
 2 content.” But the term “multimedia” has been construed as having its “plain meaning.” The plain
 3 meaning of “*multimedia*” requires multiple forms of media (*e.g.*, audio and video). *See, e.g.*,
 4 *Multimedia*, The Computer Glossary (9th edition, 2001), *Multimedia*, Microsoft’s Computer
 5 Dictionary (5th edition, 2002). Because audio alone is a single, not multiple, media, Sonos’s
 6 contentions that rely upon audio alone fail to satisfy this limitation. Thus, casting audio to a speaker
 7 for playback would not satisfy the claims of the ’615 patent.

8 As another example, Sonos has failed to identify a “local playback queue on the particular
 9 playback device.” Without any “local playback queue” to point to, Sonos is relegated to presenting
 10 three different theories for this limitation. Specifically, Sonos alleges as follows:

11 Sonos contends that that (i) each of Google’s data variables
 12 `currentVideoIdDeprecated` and `currentWatchEndPoint.videoID`
 13 amounts to the claimed “local playback queue” with the “videoID” of
 14 the current media item amounting to “an identifier of the multimedia
 15 content,” (ii) alternatively, one or both of Google’s data variables
 16 `currentVideoIdDeprecated` and `currentWatchEndPoint.videoID` in
 17 combination with Google’s data variable `upNextVideoID` amounts to
 18 the claimed “local playback queue” with the “videoID” of the current
 19 media item and the “videoID” of the next media item each amounting
 20 to “an identifier of the multimedia content,” and (iii) alternatively,
 21 Google’s “WatchNextResponse” data structure by itself (or in
 22 combination with one or more of the aforementioned data variables)
 23 amounts to the claimed “local playback queue” with the “videoID” of
 24 one or more of the current, previous, and/or next media item
 25 amounting to “an identifier of the multimedia content.”

19 *See, e.g.*, Infringement Contention, Ex. A at 107. None of these theories satisfy the claims under
 20 Google’s or Sonos’s proposed construction. Google’s accused YouTube application does not use a
 21 “local playback queue,” it uses a cloud queue. Sonos’s three theories merely point to data that
 22 relates to entries in the queue that is stored on the MDx server. While a client device may choose
 23 to retrieve and buffer (or cache) data related to the queue that is stored in the cloud to optimize
 24 playback (*e.g.*, the next videoID), that data is not the ordered list of multimedia items selected by
 25 the user for playback. Thus, Sonos’s three theories fail for at least the reason that Google maintains
 26 a cloud queue, not a local playback queue.

27 Specifically, as proposed by Google, a “playback queue” is “an ordered list of multimedia
 28 items that is selected by the user for playback.” In devices running the accused YouTube application

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1 the ordered list of multimedia items that is selected by the user for playback is stored on the MDx
 2 server. It is not stored locally on the client device running the YouTube application. In particular,
 3 Google’s accused YouTube applications use Version 3 of the MDx protocol. This version of MDx
 4 employs a “cloud queue.” The “cloud queue,” as its name implies, is not “stored on the particular
 5 playback device” and is not a “local” playback queue. Indeed, Google’s documents explain that one
 6 of the differences between Version 2 and Version 3 of the MDx protocol is that “the queue is now
 7 maintained on the MDx server and *not* the TV.” *See, e.g.*, GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00041650 at 55
 8 (emphasis added); GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00039798 (“When Casting, *the queue is persisted as a*
 9 *server-side 'remote queue'*”), GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00039799 (“YouTube Music clients can
 10 Cast to Living Room devices. In comparison to the 1st party case where *the queue is a client-side*
 11 *construct, the Casting use case stores the queue in YouTube servers as a ‘Remote Queue’*
 12 *playlist.*”), GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00039800 (“The *MDx Session Server manages the ‘Remote*
 13 *Queue’ playlist* as well as the broader multi-device experience while Casting.”); *see also* GOOG-
 14 SONOSWDTX-00039889, GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00039916, GOOG-SONOSWDTX-
 15 00040156, GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00040287, GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00040397, GOOG-
 16 SONOSWDTX-00041491, GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00041525, GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00041743.

17 The source code for the accused YouTube applications confirms that the playback queue is
 18 stored remotely on the MDx server, not locally on the playback device. For example, the MDx
 19 server (also called a “Lounge Server”) includes a “SharedQueue.java” file that defines the
 20 operations of the playback queue and a file “LoungeSharedQueue.java” that implements the
 21 SharedQueue. The SharedQueue stored on the MDx server is a “playback queue” and includes the
 22 characteristics that one skilled in the art would understand to define a queue.

23 For example, a POSITA would understand that a “playback queue” is an ordered list of
 24 multimedia items. The SharedQueue stored on the MDx includes an ordered list of multimedia
 25 items. Indeed, at lines 32 to 35 of SharedQueue.java “List<VideoID> getVideoIds()” returns an
 26 ordered list of VideoIds for playback, thereby demonstrating that the SharedQueue includes an
 27 “ordered list” of videoIDs. Similarly, lines 68-72 of SharedQueue.java returns a “list” of
 28 “QueueItems,” which are defined in the file QueueItem.java at line 14 to 17 as a VideoID and its

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1 associated data (namely, a “CredentialTransferToken,” and a “DeviceType”). Relatedly, at lines
 2 28 to 30 “int getIndex(VideoID id) returns the index of the queue item corresponding to a
 3 videoID. The ShareQueue in the list is “zero indexed,” meaning that [0] returns the first item in the
 4 list, [1] returns the second item in the list, [2] returns the third item in the list and so on. In other
 5 words, the SharedQueue includes an indexed list of videoIDs.

6 As another example, a person of skill in the art would understand that a queue can be edited
 7 and managed, with items added or removed from the queue. The SharedQueue can also be edited
 8 and managed. *See also* ’615 patent at 16:25-31 (“queue that the user is editing/managing in the third
 9 party application”). For instance, at lines 14-20 of the file SharedQueue.java the command
 10 “add(QueueItem queueItem)” adds a QueueItem (which contains a videoIDs) to the end of the
 11 queue, and the command “addAll(List<QueueItem> queueItems)” adds a list of QueueItems (which
 12 contains a list of videoIDs) to the SharedQueue. Further, items in the SharedQueue can be removed
 13 (SharedQueue.java at lines 53-61), added to the SharedQueue at a given position (SharedQueue.java
 14 at lines 38-41), and moved “forward or backward” (SharedQueue.java at lines 47-51). Thus, Google
 15 implements a cloud queue, not a “local playback queue.”

16 Each of Sonos’s theories fails for other reasons as well. Sonos’s first theory is that the
 17 currentVideoIdDeprecated and currentWatchEndPoint.videoID amounts to the claimed “local
 18 playback queue.” Sonos has not identified any evidence that these variables are stored on the
 19 playback device as an ordered list. In fact, currentVideoIdDeprecated and
 20 currentWatchEndPoint.videoID are both identifiers that relate to the currently playing video (with
 21 currentVideoIdDeprecated having been deprecated in favor of the currentWatchEndPoint.videoID)—
 22 they are not identifiers for the current and next video. A queue is not a variable that is populated
 23 with only a single, fixed item: the current videoID. Rather, a queue is an ordered list, which may
 24 be populated with zero, one or more multimedia items. Nor has Sonos pointed to any evidence that
 25 these variables are used for playback. For instance, the currentVideoIdDeprecated and
 26 currentWatchEndPoint.videoID variables that Sonos identifies are *not* used for playback. They are
 27 instead used to *identify* what is currently being played, as part of status updates, but not to request
 28 or access media for playback (*see* remote.ts). Thus, neither of these items can form a *playback*

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1 queue. Moreover, these two variables are not the list of multimedia items selected by the user—
2 they are, at best, data that relates to entries in the user-created queue of multimedia items that is
3 stored in the cloud.

4 Sonos’s second theory is similarly deficient. In this theory, Sonos again points to the
5 `currentVideoIdDeprecated` and `currentWatchEndPoint.videoID`, but this time adds into the mix the
6 variable `upNextVideoID`. The addition of the `upNextVideoID` does not cure the deficiencies
7 identified in connection with Sonos’s first theory, and the theory thus fails for all the reasons
8 discussed above. Moreover, Sonos’s expert, Dr. Schmidt, also admitted that storing multiple data
9 variables in memory, including a variable for the current and next video, would not satisfy Google’s
10 construction of “local playback queue” because the variables are “not stored as an ‘ordered list.’” 2-
11 11-2022 Schmidt Decl., ¶88. Additionally, the `upNextVideo` variable is used only for playing the
12 next “autoplay” video, if any. An autoplay video is a recommended video that is selected by the
13 MDx server after the MDx playlist is emptied—it is not part of the playlist and is not “selected by
14 the user.” If there is at least one video that would follow the currently playing video in the playlist
15 on the MDx server, the `upNextVideoId` is immediately ignored and the `upNextVideoId` variable,
16 because it is a variable local to the `handleWatchNextLoaded()` function, is deallocated when the
17 `handleWatchNextLoaded()` function returns. Thus, far from a local playback queue, the
18 `upNextVideoID` is a variable that is used once the user’s playlist on the MDx server is
19 emptied. Further, the autoplay feature is *not* used with all YouTube applications. For example, the
20 YouTube Music application does not use autoplay, and thus Sonos’s second theory cannot show
21 infringement by YouTube Music.

22 Sonos’s third theory relies upon the `WatchNextResponse`. But the `WatchNextResponse` is
23 not a “local playback queue” and does not store “an ordered list of multimedia items that is selected
24 by the user for playback.” The ordered list of multimedia items that is selected by the user for
25 playback is stored on the MDx server, as already explained. Far from being a “local playback
26 queue,” the `WatchNext Response` is used to populate much of the UI (including metadata,
27 comments, playlist panel, and advertisements, etc.).
28

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1 Sonos contends that the term “playback queue” should be given its “plain and ordinary”
2 meaning. Google’s construction of “playback queue,” however, is the plain meaning, and a “local
3 playback queue on the particular playback device” is a playback queue in a data structure within the
4 particular playback device. Thus, Sonos has failed to demonstrate that the accused YouTube
5 application includes a local playback queue on the particular playback device under the “plain
6 meaning.”

7 Moreover, the variables and WatchNextResponse that Sonos points to are not a local
8 playback queue under any reasonable interpretation of “plain meaning.” A person of skill in the art
9 would understand that a playback queue is stored in a data structure by linking together different
10 multimedia items in a particular order using linked lists, arrays, vectors, or other well-known data
11 structures. The videoIDs and WatchNext structure that Sonos accuses are not a “queue,” but rather
12 information related to populating the UI, including numerous items of information such as metadata,
13 video owner, playlist panel, suggested videos, and so on). At most, the WatchNextResponse
14 includes a videoID related to the next media in the MDx queue that is retrieved and buffered (or
15 cached) to optimize playback and provide status updates. Persons of skill in the art would recognize
16 that this buffered data serves a very different purpose from a queue and are not the queue
17 themselves. Buffers can be used to quickly cache information such that access to it is more
18 immediate than to a resource in a more remote portion of the storage hierarchy. Queues, in contrast,
19 are created to organize and store (in this context) multimedia items for playback. 2-11-2022
20 Kyriakakis Declaration, ¶52. These are distinct concepts and a person of skill in the art would not
21 confuse or conflate them. Indeed, a queue data structure persists beyond the playback of the current
22 or next song, unlike the variables that Sonos is accusing. The action of buffering a variable for the
23 currently playing or next song in a cloud queue on a playback device does not create a “local
24 playback queue” as claimed. Moreover, as explained earlier, a person of skill in the art would
25 understand that a queue can be edited and managed, with items added or removed from the queue,
26 while the variables and WatchNextResponse that Sonos identifies are static items that do not permit
27 such queue manipulation.

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1 Even if Sonos had pointed to a “local playback queue” (it has not), Sonos has not
2 demonstrated that transferring playback “caus[es] one or more first cloud servers to add multimedia
3 content to a local playback queue on the particular playback device, wherein adding the multimedia
4 content to the local playback queue comprises the one or more first cloud servers adding, to the local
5 playback queue, one or more resource locators corresponding to respective locations of the of the
6 multimedia content at one or more second cloud servers of a streaming content service.”

7 Sonos’s current contentions point only to videoIDs being added to the local playback
8 queue. A videoID is not the “multimedia *content*” under the plain meaning of the claim language. A
9 person of skill in the art would understand that “content” is the multimedia file or the information
10 and data within that file. A videoID is, at best, a unique identifier for the content. Indeed, the claim
11 language recites that the playback device must “play back the multimedia content.” A person of
12 skill in the art would understand that a playback device cannot play back a videoID because it does
13 not include audio, video or any other content. Claim 13 also states that a “resource locator
14 correspond[s] to the respective locations of the multimedia content at one or more second cloud
15 servers,” thereby distinguishing the “resource locator” (which Sonos has identified as a videoID)
16 from the “content.” Relatedly, dependent claim 20, which depends on claim 13, recites “wherein
17 causing the one or more first cloud servers to add multimedia content to the local playback queue
18 on the particular playback device comprises causing an identifier of the multimedia content to be
19 added to the local playback queue,” thereby distinguishing an identifier from the multimedia content
20 itself. Sonos’s other patents also distinguish storing a “content identifier” in the playback queue
21 from storing the content itself. *See, e.g.*, U.S. Patent No. 9,674,587 (“even if the playback queue is
22 not reachable by the device, it may be desirable to store the content, content identification, and/or
23 content pointer on the device until a time when the playback queue can be reached.”).

24 Moreover, a videoID also is also not a “resource locator corresponding to respective
25 locations of the multimedia content at one or more second cloud servers of a streaming content
26 service.” Google has proposed that the term “resource locator” means an “address of a resource on
27 the Internet.” As mentioned, a videoID is an identifier—it is not an address. Sonos does not appear
28 to dispute that a videoID is not a resource locator under Google’s construction. Sonos has also

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1 failed to show the claimed “resource locator” under its own construction. Even if a resource locator
2 could be an identifier (it cannot), the identifier does not “correspond[] to respective locations of the
3 multimedia content at one or more second cloud servers of a streaming content service.” Indeed, a
4 person of skill in the art would understand that the server that stores the content cannot be identified
5 by the videoID. In fact, in the accused systems after a videoID is received it must subsequently be
6 mapped to a server from which to request the content. The same videoID may be mapped to
7 different servers depending on various conditions and circumstances. In other words, the location
8 of the multimedia contention from which the alleged playback device should retrieve the content is
9 not even known at the time the videoID is received.

10 Sonos’s reliance on “URLs” is also misplaced. Sonos has not provided any evidence that
11 the URLs are stored in a “local playback queue.” Indeed, as previously mentioned, Sonos contends
12 that (1) each of Google’s data variables `currentVideoIdDeprecated` and
13 `currentWatchEndPoint.videoID` amounts to the claimed “local playback queue,” (2) one or both of
14 Google’s data variables `currentVideoIdDeprecated` and `currentWatchEndPoint.videoID` in
15 combination with Google’s data variable `upNextVideoID` amounts to the claimed “local playback
16 queue,” or (3) a “WatchNextResponse” is the claimed “local playback queue.” Sonos has not shown
17 that the accused data variables and WatchNext response that Sonos contends are a “local playback
18 queue” also store one or more URL.

19 Additionally, Google does not infringe Claim 13 because Sonos has not shown Google sells,
20 offers to sell, or imports into the United States a “a control device to implement a method,” e.g., the
21 control device “causing a graphical interface to display a control interface including one or more
22 transport controls to control playback by the control device,” that contains the accused application
23 and functionality.

24 Sonos has also failed to show that the claims are satisfied under the doctrine of equivalents
25 (“DoE”).

26 Initially, Sonos’s DoE analysis is conclusory and does not cite to any evidence or provide
27 an explanation that might support a finding of infringement under DoE. Thus, Sonos has failed to
28

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1 meet its burden under DoE. To the extent Sonos is permitted to expand upon its DoE analysis or
 2 provide additional evidence or explanation, Google reserves the right to supplement its response.

3 Moreover, Sonos’s DoE arguments cannot prevail because they read the “local playback
 4 queue” limitation out of the claims in order to accuse YouTube’s Cloud Queue. *See Duncan*
 5 *Parking Technologies, Inc. v. IPS Group, Inc.*, 2019 WL 386013, *8-*9 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The
 6 doctrine of equivalents cannot be used to erase meaningful structural and functional limitations of
 7 the claim on which the public is entitled to rely in avoiding infringement.”); *Augme Technologies,*
 8 *Inc. v. Yahoo! Inc.*, 755 F.3d 1326, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“As construed, embedded code does not
 9 include externally linked code. Augme’s arguments that the Combined RMX Module is equivalent
 10 to the embedded first code module are essentially identical to its claim construction arguments:
 11 namely that linked code can fall within the definition of embedded code. No reasonable jury could
 12 find equivalence here because doing so would require a determination that embedded code is
 13 substantially the same as linked code—the very thing that the construction of ‘embedded’ excludes.
 14 ‘[T]he concept of equivalency cannot embrace a structure that is specifically excluded from the
 15 scope of the claims.’ While we have recognized that literal failure to meet a claim limitation does
 16 not necessarily constitute a ‘specific exclusion,’ we have found ‘specific exclusion’ where the
 17 patentee seeks to encompass a structural feature that is the opposite of, or inconsistent with, the
 18 recited limitation.”). The accused YouTube applications’ use of a Cloud Queue stored on the MDx
 19 server reflects a substantially different approach to the use of a “local playback queue.” Put another
 20 way, a “local playback queue” and a “remote playback queue” are fundamentally different—they
 21 are not, as Sonos contends, “insubstantial differences.”

22 Sonos’s DoE arguments fail for additional reasons as well. For example, Sonos appears to
 23 acknowledge that the control device does not “directly cause a ‘first cloud server’ to add a ‘resource
 24 locator’ to the ‘local playback queue on the particular playback device.” Indeed, in Google’s system
 25 the transmission of a setPlaylist message does not cause URLs to be added to the playback device,
 26 and thus Google does not literally infringe. Sonos nevertheless argues that the “resource locator”
 27 limitation of the claim is satisfied under DoE because allegedly the setPlaylist message “*indirectly*
 28 causes one or more cloud servers to add one or more URLs for a media item to a Cast-enabled media

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1 player’s memory (constituting the “local playback queue”).” Initially, Sonos has not demonstrated
2 that the accused setPlaylist message “indirectly” causes the addition of one or more URLs. Indeed,
3 Sonos’s contentions fail to describe how URLs are fetched and added to the alleged
4 queue. Moreover, Sonos’s conclusory DoE analysis fails to demonstrate that the difference between
5 the claims and Google’s accused devices is an insubstantial difference or that the difference meets
6 the function/way/result test. Indeed, Google’s products do not perform substantially the same
7 function, in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same result. The claimed
8 “invention” contemplates a system in which transferring playback to a playback device causes one
9 or more resource locators that correspond to the location of the multimedia content for playback to
10 be added to a local playback queue. However, such a simplistic system would be unworkable for a
11 system the size of YouTube—it could not scale for the large volume of users that YouTube
12 supports. In the accused YouTube system, rather than adding a URL at the time of transfer, a
13 videoID is added. URLs are later retrieved at the time of playback, which involves separate
14 processes that, among other things, mapping the playback device to the appropriate CDN server
15 based on various factors, including network latency and system load. Moreover, the YouTube
16 system may include different resource locators for different chunks of the media item or formats. In
17 other words, unlike the claims, which contemplate a static locator for the multimedia content, in the
18 YouTube system there is no URL that can be considered a single resource locator for the multimedia
19 content. These various differences are substantial differences from the simplistic system in the ‘615
20 patent because the simplistic system in the ‘615 patent would not scale. Thus, Google does not
21 infringe under the DoE at least because it does not perform substantially the same function (*e.g.*, at
22 least because the original function in the claim provides a static URL as part of the transfer, while
23 the transfer in the accused system provides a videoIDs), in substantially the same way (*e.g.*, at least
24 because the original function in the claim receives the URL as part of the transfer, but the accused
25 systems receives a URL as part of playback and after mapping the playback device to an CDN server
26 based on various criteria), to achieve substantially the same result (*e.g.*, at least because the original
27 function receives a static URL identifying the location of the multimedia content, but in the accused
28 systems there is no URL that can be considered a single resource locator for the multimedia content).

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1 Sonos further acknowledges that in the accused YouTube systems there is not a single data
2 structure that stores an ordered list of multimedia items for playback. Nevertheless, Sonos contends
3 that storing multimedia items in multiple, individual data variables is an “insubstantial difference”
4 that would satisfy the claims under DoE. Sonos’s DoE argument eliminates the requirement of
5 a “playback queue” from the claims and essentially equates the term “playback queue” with
6 “memory.” It also eliminates the distinction between a “remote playback queue” and a “local
7 playback queue,” which, as explained above, are fundamentally different. Indeed, Sonos’s patents
8 distinguish between a “local playback queue” (‘615 patent) and a “remote playback queue” (‘033
9 patent), and indicate that the distinction between these two is not whether multimedia is stored in
10 memory of the playback device. Indeed, the claims of the ‘033 patent recite that playback of a
11 “remote playback queue” may involve “communicat[ing] with the cloud-based computing system
12 in order to obtain data identifying a next one or more media items that are in the remote playback
13 queue” (*i.e.*, storing multimedia items in the memory of the playback device). If the term “local
14 playback queue” were read so broadly as to cover a playback device that merely retrieves individual
15 media items from a remote playback queue and stores them in memory, then the ‘033 patent would
16 involve playing back a local playback queue. However, the claims of the ‘033 patent include no
17 mention of a “local playback queue” and instead recites that the playback device is playing back a
18 “remote playback queue.”

19 Sonos further argues that the “local playback queue” may comprise “a user-selected initial
20 media item and an additional ‘Autoplay’ media item that was identified by the user’s selection of
21 the initial media item.” Sonos’s conclusory DoE analysis fails to demonstrate that the difference
22 between the claims and Google’s accused devices is an insubstantial difference or that the difference
23 meets the function/way/result test. Google’s products do not perform substantially the same
24 function, in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same result. The claimed
25 invention contemplates a system in which a user may “queue up” items in a playback queue and
26 then transfer playback of a “playback queue” from a control device to a playback device. ‘615
27 patent, 17:12-20. The user may select media items (e.g., individual tracks or playlists provided by
28 online music providers, or station) that should be added to the “playback queue,” and may add,

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1 delete, or move tracks, or may play them back in a particular order (shuffled, unshuffled, repeat
2 track, etc.). ’615 patent, 16:55-59, 16:25-31. Because the accused Autoplay feature is not part of
3 the “playback queue,” it does not provide the features and functionalities of a queue. Users cannot
4 edit the Autoplay media items, cannot move them around, cannot play them back in an unshuffled
5 order, cannot delete them, etc. In other words, Sonos’s DoE argument essentially removes the
6 requirement that the “playback device” playback a “playback queue” and reads the term so broadly
7 as to cover any gapless playback of audio. There is a substantial difference between playing back
8 media items from a playback queue, versus playing back a recommended set of media that is not
9 added to the playback queue.

10 Sonos lastly argues that there is an insubstantial difference between having a playback device
11 that causes playback of media content to be transferred to a local playback queue that is previously
12 populated with resource locators for the media items selected by the user and transferring playback
13 to a playback device that is not already previously populated with resource locators for the media
14 items selected by the user. But Sonos has not shown that Google’s accused products add resource
15 locators to any alleged playback queue—whether populated or unpopulated. Instead, Sonos merely
16 argues that resource locators are added to a variable in memory. Claim 13 of the ’615 patent recites
17 “**adding**, to the local playback queue, one or more resource locators.” By accusing resource locators
18 that are allegedly added to a variable in memory, rather than “the local playback queue,” Sonos
19 applies DoE in a manner that would completely eliminate a claim element—i.e., render the
20 requirement of adding resource locators to the “local playback queue” inconsequential and
21 ineffective. As explained above, Sonos has not pointed to any playback queue structure, or
22 equivalent to a playback queue structure. Thus, Sonos cannot show that one or more resource
23 locators are added to such a structure (whether it is populated or unpopulated).

24 Google further responds by referring Sonos to the source code produced in this case,
25 including the following exemplary source code files: innertube_watch_next.py, remote.ts, watch.ts,
26 loungeadapter.ts, videoplayer.js, RealLoungeSessionManager.java, LoungeSession.java,
27 CloudSession.java, CastV3Session.java, MdxSessionFactory.java.

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY**’615 Patent, Claims 14-15, 18-21**

Claims 14-15 and 18-21 depend on Claim 13. Accordingly, Google does not infringe these claims at least for the reasons identified in connection with Claim 13.

Additionally, the term “media particular playback system” in Claim 15 was held indefinite. Thus, Google cannot infringe claim 15 because it is invalid.

Further, the accused YouTube applications do not infringe Claims 14 and 15 for the additional reason that Sonos has not shown the accused YouTube applications “detect[] a set of inputs to transfer playback from the control device to” a “particular zone of a media playback system” or a “particular zone group of a media particular playback system.” The accused YouTube applications are not concerned with and do not use “zones” or “zone group.” At most, Sonos’s contentions identify traditional speaker groupings. A grouping of speakers in the accused YouTube applications do not require or suggest that the speakers are part of a particular area of “zone,” and, in fact, speakers may be located in different areas.

The accused YouTube applications do not infringe claim 18 for the additional reason that Sonos has not shown the accused YouTube applications transfer playback from the playback device back to the control device. At most, Sonos has shown that the accused YouTube applications permit the alleged control device to stop casting.

The accused YouTube applications do not infringe claim 21 for the additional reason that Sonos has not shown the accused YouTube applications “send[] a message to the streaming content service that causes the one or more first cloud servers to add the multimedia content to the local playback queue on the particular playback device.” For example, Sonos points to a “setPlaylist” message as causing the MDx server to add one or more videoIDs. However, Sonos has not shown that the videoID is the actual “multimedia *content*,” and Sonos also has not shown that the videoID is added to the “local playback queue.”

’615 Patent, Claim 25

Claim 25 recites a “control device comprising: a graphical interface; a wireless communication interface to communicate with a playback device; one or more processors.” The remaining limitations of Claim 25 correspond to the limitation of claim 13 discussed above. Google

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1 does not infringe these limitations for the reasons discussed in connection with claim
 2 13. Additionally, Google does not infringe Claim 25 because Sonos has not shown Google sells,
 3 offers to sell, or imports into the United States a “control device comprising: a graphical interface;
 4 a wireless communication interface to communicate with a playback device; one or more
 5 processors” that contains the accused application and functionality.

’615 Patent, Claim 26

7 Claim 26 depends on Claim 25. Accordingly, Google does not infringe these claims at least
 8 for the reasons identified in connection with Claim 25.

9 Additionally, the term “media particular playback system” in Claim 26 was held
 10 indefinite. Thus, Google cannot infringe claim 26 because it is invalid.

11 Further, the accused YouTube application do not infringe Claim 26 for the additional reason
 12 that Sonos has not shown the accused YouTube applications “detect[] a set of inputs to transfer
 13 playback from the control device to a particular zone group of a media particular playback
 14 system.” The accused YouTube applications are not concerned with and do not use “zones” or
 15 “zone group.” At most, Sonos’s contentions identify traditional speaker groupings. A grouping of
 16 speakers in the accused YouTube applications do not require or suggest that the speakers are part of
 17 a particular area of “zone,” and, in fact, speakers may be located in different areas.

Google Play Music

19 Google announced plans to shut down Play Music in June of 2018. By August 2020, Google
 20 announced a detailed shutdown timeline starting in late August and ending with complete tumdown
 21 in December. Google began shutting down the Google Play Music application in September with
 22 all usage of the service discontinued in December
 23 2020. <https://support.google.com/youtubemusic/thread/62843644/google-play-music-music-play-store-music-manager-are-going-away-%E2%80%93-everything-you-need-to-know?hl=en>. Sonos
 25 did not provide Google with actual notice of the asserted patents until at least September 28, 2020
 26 when it provided a copy of the complaint, and cannot obtain pre-complaint damages due to its failure
 27 to mark. Sonos has not provided any evidence that Google made, used, offered for sale or sole
 28 computing devices with the Google Play Music application on or after September 28, 2020, and thus

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1 has failed to demonstrate any infringement. And while Google denies any infringement, given its
 2 decision to discontinue the Google Play Music service in September any alleged infringement would
 3 be *de minimis*, at best, and therefore warrant dismissal of Sonos’s allegations for Google Play
 4 Music. *See, e.g., Nichia Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor Co., Ltd.*, 2007 WL 2428040 (N.D. Cal.
 5 2007) (granting patentee summary judgment dismissing accused infringer’s *de minimis*
 6 infringement defense where allegedly only 40 accused diodes had been sold).

‘615 Patent, Claim 13

8 **“wherein transferring playback from the control device to the particular playback**
 9 **device comprises: causing one or more first cloud servers to add multimedia content to a local**
 10 **playback queue on the particular playback device, wherein adding the multimedia content to**
 11 **the local playback queue comprises the one or more first cloud servers adding, to the local**
 12 **playback queue, one or more resource locators corresponding to respective locations of the**
 13 **multimedia content at one or more second cloud servers of a streaming content**
 14 **service.”** Sonos’s contentions fails to demonstrate that this limitation is satisfied for many reasons.

15 For example, Sonos appears to contend that audio alone may be the claimed “multimedia
 16 content.” But the term “multimedia” has been construed as having its “plain meaning.” The plain
 17 meaning of “*multimedia*” requires multiple forms of media (*e.g.*, audio and video). *See, e.g.*,
 18 *Multimedia*, The Computer Glossary (9th edition, 2001), *Multimedia*, Microsoft’s Computer
 19 Dictionary (5th edition, 2002). Because audio alone is a single, not multiple, media, Sonos’s
 20 contentions that rely upon audio alone fail to satisfy this limitation.

21 As another example, Sonos has failed to identify a “local playback queue on the particular
 22 playback device.” Without any “local playback queue” to point to, Sonos alleges as follows:

23 In this regard, Sonos contends that Google’s data structure
 24 “itemWindowResponse.items” amounts to the claimed “local
 25 playback queue” with each of the “itemID” and “trackUrl” of the
 26 “nextItem” amounting to the “one or more resource locators
 27 corresponding to respective locations of the multimedia content.”
 28

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1 *See, e.g.*, Infringement Contention, Ex. A at 107. None of these theories satisfy the claims
2 under Google’s or Sonos’s proposed construction. The Google Play Music services uses a cloud
3 queue, not a “local playback queue.”

4 Specifically, as proposed by Google, a “playback queue” is “an ordered list of multimedia
5 items that is selected by the user for playback.” In receivers using the accused Google Play Music
6 service the ordered list of multimedia items that is selected by the user for playback is stored on a
7 Cloud Queue server. *See, e.g.*, GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00041650 at 55. It is not stored locally on
8 the receiver. Sonos’s “local playback queue” theory merely point to data that relates to entries in
9 the queue that is stored on the Cloud Queue server. While a receiver may choose to retrieve and
10 buffer (or cache) data related to the queue that is stored in the cloud to optimize playback (*e.g.*, the
11 itemID and track URLs), that data is not the ordered list of multimedia items selected by the user
12 for playback. Thus, Sonos’s theory fail for at least the reason that Google maintains a cloud queue,
13 not a local playback queue.

14 Sonos has also failed to show a “local playback queue” under its own construction. Sonos
15 contends that the term “local playback queue” should be given its “plain and ordinary”
16 meaning. Sonos does not identify how the plain meaning differs from Google’s construction, or
17 what Sonos contends is the “plain and ordinary meaning” of “local playback queue.” A person of
18 skill in the art would understand that a playback queue is stored in a data structure by linking together
19 different multimedia items in a particular order using linked lists, arrays, vectors, or other well-
20 known data structures. Where a queue is maintained in the cloud, which is the case with the accused
21 Google Play Music applications, the client device may choose to retrieve and buffer (or cache) data
22 related to the queue stored in the cloud in order to optimize playback. Persons of skill in the art
23 would recognize that this buffered data serves a very different purpose from a queue and are not the
24 queue themselves. Buffers can be used to quickly cache information such that access to it is more
25 immediate than to a resource in a more remote portion of the storage hierarchy. Queues, in contrast,
26 are created to organize and store (in this context) multimedia items for playback. These are distinct
27 concepts and a person of skill in the art would not confuse or conflate them.

28

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1 That Sonos has failed to show Google Play Music includes a “local playback queue” is also
 2 demonstrated by the history of the parties’ collaboration and Sonos’s own documents. The
 3 functionality Sonos accuses of infringement is the Cloud Queue functionality that was developed in
 4 connection with the parties’ collaboration in 2013, and described in the Cloud Queue API. As part
 5 of that collaboration, Google and Sonos collaborated and released and integrated a cloud queue API
 6 into Google Play Music. As the Cloud Queue API document explains, the Cloud Queue replaces a
 7 local playback queue by “move[ing] the queue to the Cloud Queue server”

8 In the current implementation of cast in Play Music, the device
 9 running the Music app (i.e., the sender) queues tracks to the
 10 Chromecast of Sonos device (i.e., the Receiver). If the Sender leaves
 11 the network or is switched off, playback stops as well. By moving
 the queue to the Cloud Queue server, the Receiver can fetch tracks
 without requiring the Sender to be around.

12 GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00037081; *see also* GOOG-SONOSWDTX-00043627 at 32-
 13 33. Google’s source code also repeatedly refers to the accused playback devices playing back a
 14 Cloud Queue or items in the Cloud queue. *See, e.g.*, `playermanager.js`, line 2730-2755 (“Start
 15 playing the current cloud queue item”), 2757-2770 (“Start playing the current cloud queue item and
 16 fetch a window containing the previous, current, and next items”).

17 The accused `ItemWindowResponse` does not show a “local playback queue.” Caching a
 18 window of “track” URLs from the Cloud Queue in order to optimize playback is merely an
 19 implementation detail of playing back a remote Cloud Queue. The window of tracks is not the
 20 playback queue, which remains stored on the Cloud Queue. Indeed, the Cloud Queue stored in the
 21 CQ servers contains a list of `itemIds` corresponding to the items in the Cloud Queue and further
 22 metadata about the queue. These include, for instance, the normal playback order of the items,
 23 whether shuffle mode is enabled, the shuffled playback order of the items, and the playback modes
 24 (e.g., repeat track). *See* `cloud_queue.proto`, lines 303-327, 232-257. The `getItemWindow` response,
 25 in contrast, contains a static set of items that do not support the same type of queue
 26 management. Further, Sonos’s own Developer website, which describes Sonos’s Cloud Queue API,
 27 includes the retrieval of an `itemWindow`, which obtains a “window of tracks,” as part of the Cloud
 28 Queue API functionality, thereby confirming that retrieving a window of tracks from a Cloud Queue

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1 stored remotely is an implementation detail of the “cloud queue” functionality and not a “local
 2 playback queue.” [https://developer.sonos.com/reference/cloud-queue-api/get-
 3 itemwindow/](https://developer.sonos.com/reference/cloud-queue-api/get-itemwindow/). Similarly, in 2014 Sonos filed a patent provisional application entitled “Cloud
 4 Queue” naming Tad Coburn as an author. U.S. Application No. 62/007,906. Under the heading
 5 “terminology” Sonos referred to the “CloudQueue as a replacement for the queue data structure
 6 stored within a Sonos player.” *Id.* at 17. The application also confirms that caching a window of
 7 tracks locally is not the playback queue by explaining that “the player fetches an initial window of
 8 tracks from the CloudQueue and stores (caches) it locally.” *Id.* at 22. This serves as further
 9 evidence that Sonos is accusing details of implementing a cloud queue, not a local playback queue.

10 Additionally, Google does not infringe Claim 13 because Sonos has not shown
 11 Google sells, offers to sell, or imports into the United States a “a control device to implement a
 12 method,” e.g., the control device “causing a graphical interface to display a control interface
 13 including one or more transport controls to control playback by the control device,” that contains
 14 the accused application and functionality.

’615 Patent, Claims 14-15, 18-21

16 Claims 14-15 and 18-21 depend on Claim 13. Accordingly, Google does not infringe these
 17 claims at least for the reasons identified in connection with Claim 13.

18 Additionally, the term “media particular playback system” in Claim 15 was held
 19 indefinite. Thus, Google cannot infringe claim 15 because it is invalid.

20 Further, the accused Google Play Music application does not infringe Claims 14 and 15 for
 21 the additional reason that Sonos has not shown the accused Google Play Music application “detect[s]
 22 a set of inputs to transfer playback from the control device to” a “particular zone of a media playback
 23 system” or a “particular zone group of a media particular playback system.” The accused Google
 24 Play Music application is not concerned with and do not use “zones” or “zone groups.” At most,
 25 Sonos’s contentions identify traditional speaker groupings. A grouping of speakers in the accused
 26 Google Play Music application does not require or suggest that the speakers are part of a particular
 27 area of “zone,” and, in fact, speakers may be located in different areas.

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1 The accused Google Play Music application does not infringe claim 18 for the additional
2 reason that Sonos has not shown the accused YouTube applications transfer playback from the
3 playback device back to the control device. At most, Sonos has shown that the accused Google Play
4 Music application permits the alleged control device to stop casting.

5 The accused Google Play Music application does not infringe claim 21 for the additional
6 reason that Sonos has not shown the accused Google Play Music application “send[s] a message to
7 the streaming content service that causes the one or more first cloud servers to add the multimedia
8 content to the local playback queue on the particular playback device.” Indeed, Sonos’s
9 infringement contentions discuss only a “setPlaylist” message for the YouTube applications. Sonos
10 does not explain how this limitation is satisfied for Google Play Music and thus has not met its
11 burden for the Google Play Music application.

’615 Patent, Claim 25

12
13 Claim 25 recites a “control device comprising: a graphical interface; a wireless
14 communication interface to communicate with a playback device; one or more processors.” The
15 remaining limitations of Claim 25 correspond to the limitation of claim 13 discussed above. Google
16 does not infringe these limitations for the reasons discussed in connection with claim
17 13. Additionally, Google does not infringe Claim 25 because Sonos has not shown Google sells,
18 offers to sell, or imports into the United States a “control device comprising: a graphical interface;
19 a wireless communication interface to communicate with a playback device; one or more
20 processors” that contains the accused application and functionality.

’615 Patent, Claim 26

21
22 Claim 26 depends on Claim 25. Accordingly, Google does not infringe these claims at least
23 for the reasons identified in connection with Claim 25.

24 Additionally, the term “media particular playback system” in Claim 26 was held
25 indefinite. Thus, Google cannot infringe claim 26 because it is invalid.

26 Further, the accused Google Play Music application does not infringe Claim 26 for the
27 additional reason that Sonos has not shown the accused Google Play Music applications “detect[s]
28 a set of inputs to transfer playback from the control device to a particular zone group of a media

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1 particular playback system.” The accused Google Play Music application is not concerned with and
 2 do not use “zones” or “zone group.” At most, Sonos’s contentions identify traditional speaker
 3 groupings. A grouping of speakers in the accused Google Play Music application do not require or
 4 suggest that the speakers are part of a particular area of “zone,” and, in fact, speakers may be located
 5 in different areas.

6 Google further responds by referring Sonos to the source code produced in this case,
 7 including the following exemplary source code files: cloud_queue_rpc.proto,
 8 GetItemWindowImpl.java, playermanager.js, cloudqueue.js, getitemwindowrequest.js,
 9 cloudqueueexterns.js, CloudQueueManager.java, CloudQueueSyncCoordinator.java, constant.js.

’033 Patent**’033 Patent, Claim 1**

12 **“computing device comprising: at least one processor; a non-transitory computer**
 13 **readable medium...”** Google does not infringe Claim 1 because Sonos has not shown Google sells,
 14 offers to sell, or imports into the United States a “computing device comprising: at least one
 15 processor; [and] a non-transitory computer readable medium” that contains the accused application
 16 and functionality.

17 **“based on receiving the user input, transmitting an instruction for the at least one given**
 18 **playback device to take over responsibility for playback of the remote playback queue from**
 19 **the computing device, wherein the instruction configures the at least one given playback device**
 20 **to (i) communicate with the cloud-based computing system in order to obtain data identifying**
 21 **a next one or more media items that are in the remote playback queue, (ii) use the obtained**
 22 **data to retrieve at least one media item in the remote playback queue from the cloud-based**
 23 **media service; and (iii) play back the retrieved at least one media item.”** Sonos’s contentions
 24 fails to demonstrate that this limitation is satisfied. For example, Sonos’s contentions allege that
 25 based on receiving the user input, a YouTube application running on the alleged computing device
 26 transmits a “setPlaylist” message “to one or more MDx servers.” Sonos’s Infringement Contention,
 27 Ex. B at 37. The MDx servers then generate a further set Playlist message “requesting the screen to
 28 start playing the video identified by the videoID from the currentTime.” *See, e.g.,* GOOG-

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1 SONOSWDTX-00041650 at 57. Thus, it is the MDx server, not the alleged computing device, that
2 transmits an instruction for the at least one given playback device to take over responsibility for
3 playback.

4 Moreover, Sonos has failed to demonstrate that the setPlaylist message (whether from the
5 computing device or the MDx server) performs all the functions required by the claim, namely: (i)
6 communicate with the cloud-based computing system in order to obtain data identifying a next one
7 or more media items that are in the remote playback queue, (ii) use the obtained data to retrieve at
8 least one media item in the remote playback queue from the cloud-based media service; and (iii)
9 play back the retrieved at least one media item.” The setPlaylist message does not perform all of
10 these functions. Instead, there are multiple API requests and messages that occur after the setPlaylist
11 request between the server and the cast receiver to obtain data to play back from the alleged remote
12 playback queue.

13 **“remote playback queue provided by a cloud-based computing system associated with**
14 **a cloud-based media service.”** The only written description support for this limitation in the ’033
15 patent is for a remote playback queue managed by a third-party. Thus, a person of ordinary skill in
16 the art would understand that the plain meaning of a “remote playback queue provided by a cloud-
17 based computing system associated with a cloud-based media service” in the context of the claims
18 and specification requires a third-party playback queue. The CloudQueue server or MDx is only
19 provided by Google, not supplied by third parties.

20 **“detecting an indication that playback responsibility for the remote playback queue**
21 **has been successfully transferred from the computing device to the at least one given playback**
22 **device.”** Sonos’s contentions fail to demonstrate that this limitation is satisfied. For example,
23 Sonos argues that the “cast button” changing colors demonstrates that the computing device detects
24 the claimed indication. But Sonos has not identified what specifically it contends is the indication
25 that is detected by the computing device or how it satisfies the claims. Sonos appears to rely upon
26 the YouTube application detecting a successful connection to an MDxSession. Sonos’s
27 Infringement Contentions, Ex. B at 57. But Sonos has failed to articulate how a connection to an
28 MDxSession indicates that playback responsibility has been successfully transferred. An MDx

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1 Session is established prior to playback on the screen or speaker, and Sonos has failed to show that
2 playback responsibility from the alleged computing device to the alleged at least one given playback
3 device is one and the same with connection to an MDxSession.

4 Sonos has also failed to show that the claims are satisfied under the doctrine of equivalents
5 (“DoE”). Initially, Sonos’s DoE analysis is conclusory and does not cite to evidence or provide an
6 explanation that might support a finding of infringement under DoE. Thus, Sonos has failed to meet
7 its burden under DoE. To the extent Sonos is permitted to expand upon its DoE analysis or provide
8 additional evidence or explanation, Google reserves the right to supplement its response.

9 Additionally, as it does for the ‘615 patent, Sonos argues that under DoE the “playback
10 queue” the “Autoplay” feature may be considered part of the playback queue. Sonos’s conclusory
11 DoE analysis fails to demonstrate that the difference between the claims and the accused AutoPlay
12 feature is an insubstantial difference or that the difference meets the function/way/result
13 test. Google’s products do not perform substantially the same function, in substantially the same
14 way to achieve substantially the same result. The claimed invention contemplates a system in which
15 a user may “queue up” items in a playback queue and then transfer playback of a “playback queue”
16 from a control device to a playback device. ’033 patent, 17:10-17. The user may select media items
17 (e.g., individual tracks or playlists provided by online music providers, or station) that should be
18 added to the “playback queue,” and may add, delete, or move tracks, or may play them back in a
19 particular order (shuffled, unshuffled, repeat track, etc.). ’615 patent, 16:51-55, 16:22-26. Because
20 the accused Autoplay feature is not part of the “playback queue,” it does not provide the features
21 and functionalities of a queue. Users cannot edit the Autoplay media items, cannot move them
22 around, cannot play them back in an unshuffled order, cannot delete them, etc. In other words,
23 Sonos’s DoE argument essentially removes the requirement that the “playback device” playback a
24 “playback queue” and reads the term so broadly as to cover any gapless playback of audio. There
25 is a substantial difference between playing back media items from a playback queue, versus playing
26 back a recommended set of media that is not added to the playback queue.

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY**’033 Patent, Claims 2, 4, 9, 11, 16**

Claims 2, 4, 9, 11, and 16 depend on Claim 1. Accordingly, Google does not infringe these claims at least for the reasons identified in connection with Claim 1.

Further, the accused YouTube applications do not infringe Claim 2 for the additional reasons that Sonos has not shown “the instruction comprises an instruction for the cloud-based computing system associated with the media service to provide the data identifying the next one or more media items to the given playback device for use in retrieving the at least one media item from the cloud-based computing system associated with the cloud-based media service.” For example, Sonos points to the transmission of a “setPlaylist” message for this limitation. But the setPlaylist message does not cause a media service to “provide the data identifying the *next* one or more media items to the given playback device for use in retrieving the at least one media item from the cloud-based computing system.” At most, Sonos has shown that the setPlaylist message causes the MDx server to provide a videoID corresponding to the media item that is currently playing. Further, the accused YouTube applications do not infringe Claim 11 for the additional reasons that Sonos has not shown “a displayed icon indicating that playback responsibility for the remote playback queue can be transferred.”

Claim 12.

Claim 12 recites the same limitations as Claim 1. Accordingly, Google does not infringe this claim at least for the reasons identified in connection with Claim 1.

Claim 13.

Claim 13 depends on Claim 12. Accordingly, Google does not infringe these claims at least for the reasons identified in connection with Claim 12.

Further, the accused YouTube applications do not infringe Claim 13 for the additional reasons that Sonos has not shown “the instruction comprises an instruction for the cloud-based computing system associated with the cloud-based media service to provide the data identifying the next one or more media items to the given playback device for use in obtaining the at least one media item from the cloud-based computing system associated with the cloud-based media service.” For example, Sonos points to the transmission of a “setPlaylist” message for this

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1 limitation. But the setPlaylist message does not cause a media service to “provide the data
 2 identifying the *next* one or more media items to the given playback device for use in retrieving the
 3 at least one media item from the cloud-based computing system.” At most, Sonos has shown that
 4 the setPlaylist message causes the MDx server to provide a videoID corresponding to the media
 5 item that is currently playing.

’885 and ’966 Patents***Direct Infringement By Google***

8 Sonos accuses Google of directly infringing by “offering to sell, selling, and/or importing
 9 into the United States” its “Pixel” brand of computing devices in violation of 35 U.S.C. §
 10 271(a). However, Sonos has not provided any evidence that Pixel devices include the accused
 11 Google Home applications that Sonos contends are necessary for infringement when offered for
 12 sale, sold or imported in the United States.

13 Sonos also purports to identify numerous third-party devices in an Appendix 1 to the
 14 infringement contentions. Sonos has not provided any evidence that Google offers to sell, sells or
 15 imports into the United States any or all of the devices in Appendix 1. Nor has Sonos shown that
 16 any or all of these devices are even capable of including the accused Google Home application. For
 17 example, Sonos has not provided any evidence that Google offers to sell, sells or imports into the
 18 United States any Arirang (North Korean) devices, or Yota (Russian device), or that these North
 19 Korean and Russian devices are even capable of including the accused Google Home applications.

20 Sonos further alleges that Google infringes the asserted claims “by virtue of installing at
 21 least the Google Home app onto computing devices, which constitutes ‘mak[ing]’ an infringing
 22 device under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)” and because “Google has directly infringed and continues to
 23 directly infringe each asserted claim of the ’885 Patent by virtue of using Cast-enabled media
 24 players, which constitutes ‘us[ing]’ an infringing device under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).” But Sonos has
 25 not provided any evidence that Google installs the accused applications onto the accused computing
 26 devices or Cast-enabled media players. Nor has Sonos shown that any updates (*e.g.*, firmware
 27 updates) would include the accused functionality. Accordingly, Sonos has not shown any “making”
 28 of an infringing device by Google.

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1 Sonos further alleges that Google infringes the asserted claims “by virtue of testing
2 computing devices installed with at least the Google Home app, which constitutes ‘us[ing]’ an
3 infringing device under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).” Again, Sonos has failed to produce any evidence or
4 identify any instance in which Google has tested or used the devices in the manner that is accused
5 of infringing the asserted patents. Nor has Sonos provided any evidence that the damages theories
6 that it has disclosed in its Damages Contentions are tied to any internal use or testing by Google.

7 Sonos additionally alleges that Google infringes because it “operates servers in the United
8 States” that “host at least the Google Home app for download onto smartphone, tablet, and computer
9 devices, and these servers infringe certain asserted claims.” Initially, the claims at issue recite a
10 “computer-readable media having instructions encoded therein” that when executed perform certain
11 functional steps. Sonos has not provided any evidence that Google’s servers can or have performed
12 the method steps in these claims, or that they are capable of doing so. In fact, Google’s computer
13 servers do not include a computer readable media with instructions that can be executed to perform
14 the steps of the claims. Google’s servers are not a controller, do not connect to a local area network,
15 do not have the required graphical user interface or display, do not receive a request to create zone
16 scenes, do not cause creation of zone scenes, do not store zone scenes, do not configured for any
17 type of playback, do not receive indications regarding zone scenes, do not transition between
18 standalone and modes coordinating with other zone players, are not a zone player, and do not output
19 media in synchrony. Further, Sonos has not offered any evidence that any information stored on
20 Google’s servers is executable as Sonos accuses for software installed on the accused
21 devices. Sonos has also accused computing devices and playback devices that are not provided by
22 Google such that Google would not directly infringe these claims. *See Deep9 Corp. v. Barnes &*
23 *Noble, Inc.*, No. C11-0035JLR, 2012 WL 4336726 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 21, 2012) (computer readable
24 media claim not infringe where accused infringer did not provide the “common communications
25 channel” limitation because the product guide and terms of service specified “that it is the user’s
26 choice as to what internet service provider to use”).

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY***Indirect Infringement By Google***

Google contends that it has not (1) contributed to the direct infringement of the Asserted Claims (contributory infringement); or (2) induced any third party to infringe the Asserted Claims directly (induced infringement).

Sonos’s indirect infringement claims are subject to a pending motion to dismiss at least with respect to the ’033, ’966, and ’885 patents, and Google incorporates by reference its briefing.

Contributory infringement requires that an alleged infringer, with knowledge of the patent, sells, offers to sell, and/or imports into the U.S. a material part or component of the invention, knowing that it is especially made or adapted for infringement, and not a staple article or commodity suitable for substantial non-infringing use. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). “For purposes of contributory infringement, the [substantial noninfringing use] inquiry focuses on whether the accused products can be used for purposes other than infringement.” *In re Bill of Lading Transmission and Processing Sys. Patent Litig.*, 681 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Here, the accused products, and components thereof, have substantial non-infringing uses. For example, the ’966 and ’885 patents claim a “computing device” and “zone player” which Sonos has mapped to a smartphone, tablet, or other computing device and audio playback devices, respectively. The accused computing devices can be used for many functionalities that are not even related to playback of media, such as making phone calls, browsing the Internet, sending email communications, and numerous other functionalities. Sonos also alleges that Google infringes the Asserted Patents by way of the Google Home application and specifically its grouping-related functionality, but this application has many other features unrelated to speaker grouping, including Wi-Fi monitoring, thermostat control, smart home device control, individual device playback, and many others. Thus, any and all components of the Accused Products have substantial non-infringing uses.

With respect to induced infringement, Google has not, with knowledge of the patent and infringement thereof, actively induced its customers or end-users to infringe the Asserted Patents with specific intent to encourage infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b); *see Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc.*, 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1928 (2015). Sonos has not identified any evidence that Google actively induced customers or end-users to infringe or that Google did so with the specific intent to encourage

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1 infringement. There is no evidence that Google knew of the alleged infringement; in fact, Sonos
 2 admits that Google did not have knowledge of the ’966 and ’885 patents until just hours before the
 3 filing of the action. Accordingly, there is no evidence suggesting that Google took actions with the
 4 specific intent to encourage any infringement.

5 ***Alleged Infringement Under Section 271(f)***

6 In order to be liable for infringement under § 271(f), a defendant must “suppl[y]”
 7 components of a patented invention “in or from the United States” with the intent that they will be
 8 “combined outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such
 9 combination occurred within the United States.” *See* § 271(f)(1)-(2). Google does not supply
 10 components of a patented invention in or from the United States in this fashion.

11 Google provides a further response on an element by element basis below for each of the
 12 Asserted Patents.

13 The ’885 and ’996 Patents share the claim elements addressed below and therefore are not
 14 infringed for the same reasons.

15 **“zone player”**: Google does not infringe Claim 1 because Sonos has not shown Google
 16 sells, offers to sell, or imports into the United States a “zone player” that contains the accused
 17 application and functionality. For example, the accused “Cast-enabled media players” are
 18 identified as including the “Chromecast, Chromecast Audio, Chromecast Ultra, Chromecast with
 19 Google TV.” Ex. D at 1-2. Yet Sonos has not shown any evidence that these devices can perform
 20 the functions or meet the requirements of the claimed “zone player(s).” As one example, the
 21 claims require that the “zone player is configured to play back media individually.” The evidence
 22 produced by Sonos in its contentions, however, shows that none of these products are capable of
 23 “playing back media individually.” They do not contain any means for doing so, and can only be
 24 connected to other devices with playback capability.

25 Sonos argues that “Because each Cast-enabled media player is a data network device (i.e.,
 26 a device that is configured to connect to and communicate over a medium that interconnects
 27 devices in a manner that enables them to send digital data packets to and receive digital data
 28 packets from each other) and is configured to process and output audio, each Cast-enabled media

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1 player comprises a ‘zone player.’” Ex. D at 1-2. Sonos therefore recognizes that the claimed
 2 “zone player” requires more than simply connecting devices to a network. Indeed, Sonos argues
 3 that the zone player must be “configured to process and output audio,” which Sonos has failed to
 4 show for each “Cast-enabled media player.”

5 Sonos also purports to accuse “various other third-party media players with built-in Cast
 6 functionality,” but does not identify any such third-party media players. Google does not know
 7 which products Sonos is purportedly referring to. Sonos has therefore failed to meet its burden of
 8 proof regarding infringement and Google accordingly denies infringement.

9 **“network interface”**: Sonos’s contentions fail to demonstrate that this limitation is
 10 satisfied. For example, Sonos has neither identified any hardware nor any software that constitutes
 11 the claimed “network interface” within the “Cast-enabled media players.” Sonos generically
 12 references “Wi-Fi,” but does not identify any Wi-Fi hardware, software, adapters, nor any particular
 13 Wi-Fi version or compatibility for each of the “Cast-enabled media players.”

14 **“processor”**: Sonos’s contentions fail to demonstrate that this limitation is satisfied. For
 15 example, Sonos has not identified any hardware that constitutes the claimed “processor” within the
 16 “Cast-enabled media players.” Sonos generically references the specifications pages for some of
 17 the “Cast-enabled media players,” but in many instances there is no processor information provided.

18 **“non-transitory computer readable medium”**: Sonos’s contentions fail to demonstrate
 19 that this limitation is satisfied. For example, Sonos has not identified any hardware that constitutes
 20 the claimed “non-transitory computer readable medium” within the “Cast-enabled media
 21 players.” Sonos generically references the specifications pages for some of the “Cast-enabled media
 22 players,” but there is not “non-transitory computer readable medium” identified.

23 **“zone scene”**: Sonos’s contentions fail to demonstrate that this limitation is satisfied. For
 24 example, Sonos’s argument that the alleged “speaker groups” are the claimed “zone scene” is
 25 flawed. Sonos argues that:

26 Thus, this first “speaker group” that a user creates amounts to the claimed “first zone scene
 27 comprising a first predefined grouping of zone players including at least the first zone player
 28 and a second zone player that are to be configured for synchronous playback of media when
 the first zone scene is invoked” because it is a previously-saved group of Cast-enabled
 players that has been predefined to include the first Cast-enabled media player and a second

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1 Cast-enabled media player and that is capable of existing in two states – an uninvoked state
 2 in which each Cast-enabled player in the previously saved group is configured for individual
 3 playback of audio and an invoked state in which the Cast-enabled players in the previously-
 4 saved group are configured for synchronous playback of audio.

5 As the intrinsic evidence, extrinsic evidence, and the court’s claim construction held, however,
 6 “zone scenes” are not mere “speaker groups” as Sonos alleges in its infringement
 7 contentions. Sonos’s allegation that the groups are “previously saved” is unclear as Sonos does not
 8 identify what the groups were saved “previous” to. Sonos’s allegation that the groups are
 9 “predefined” is unclear as Sonos does not identify when the groups were defined or what would
 10 make them predefined. Sonos also mentions an “invoked” and an “uninvoked” state for the zone
 11 players, but does not identify why or how this is relevant to its conception of “zone scenes.” Nor
 12 has Sonos identified the “invoked” and “uninvoked” states that allegedly reflect any states in the
 13 accused products.

14 Next, Sonos argues that the accused products meet the “zone scene” definition if the claim
 15 construction is maintained:

16 Moreover, even if the Court were to construe the term “zone scene” to mean “a previously-
 17 saved group of zone players according to a common theme,” as Judge Alan Albright
 18 suggested during the Markman hearing in 20-cv-881-ADA (see D.I. 106 at 38:1-3), this first
 19 “speaker group” amounts to a first “zone scene” under that construction. Indeed, every
 20 “speaker group” that a user creates in a Cast-enabled playback system is a previously-saved,
 21 predefined group of Cast-enabled players that is capable of existing in two states – an
 22 uninvoked state in which each Cast-enabled player in the previously-saved group is
 23 configured for individual playback of audio and an invoked state in which the Cast-enabled
 24 players in the previously-saved group are configured for synchronous playback of audio.

25 This is the same argument addressed immediately above, and it fails for the same reason here. Next,
 26 Sonos argues why it believes the accused products use a “common theme”:

27 Further, every “speaker group” that a user creates in a Cast-enabled playback system has
 28 some common theme, which in this context amounts to whatever common topic, subject,
 etc. led the user to decide that these particular Cast-enabled media players should be placed
 into a previously-saved group that allows for synchronous playback when invoked.
 [Citations omitted] Typically, this common theme will be a specific area (or set of areas)
 within the user’s listening environment in which the user desires to listen to audio in
 synchrony across multiple Cast-enabled media players, although Google’s “Cast”
 technology provides a user with the flexibility to create a previously saved group of Cast-
 enabled media players according to any common topic or subject that is of interest to the
 user. As part of the user workflow for creating a “speaker group,” a Cast-enabled computing
 device also prompts the user to input a name for the “speaker group,” which serves as the
 user’s shorthand label of the common theme that led the user to create the previously-saved

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1 group of Cast-enabled media players and thereby allows the user to locate and select that
 2 previously-saved group later when the user wishes to invoke it for synchronous playback.

3 This argument also fails. Sonos alleges that the common theme is “whatever common topic,
 4 subject, etc. let the user to decide that these particular Cast-enabled media players should be placed
 5 into a previously-saved group . . . ,” but never identifies any accused common theme. Nor does
 6 Sonos identify how the accused products store or are even aware of any accused common
 7 theme. Because the patent claims must provide objective notice of the scope of the patentee’s rights,
 8 Sonos’s interpretation of the claim, which makes the scope dependent on the accused infringer’s
 9 state of mind at the time of allegedly committing the infringing act, cannot be correct and would
 10 render the claim indefinite. *See, e.g., Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc.*, 239 F.3d
 11 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Amazon’s reading of the key passage from the file history injects
 12 subjective notions into the infringement analysis ... We are not prepared to assign a meaning to a
 13 patent claim that depends on the state of mind of the accused infringer.”); *see also Boston Scientific*
 14 *Corp. v. Cordis Corp.*, 2008 WL 171049, *13 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“The Court questions the
 15 permissibility of a claim limitation that relies on the subjective preference of a person who is
 16 performing a method.... the Court declines to adopt a practitioner-based definition of ‘no preferred
 17 geometric form when disposed’ because it would make the claim ambiguous and therefore arguably
 18 indefinite.”). Sonos does not identify any instrumentality in the accused products that stores or
 19 receives the alleged common theme information. Neither does Sonos articulate how, even if its
 20 infringement theory is credited, one is to determine when a user creates a group with the alleged
 21 “common theme” or does not create a group with the alleged “common theme.” To the extent Sonos
 22 is arguing that a common theme is necessarily present whenever a group is created, then Sonos has
 23 improperly conflated the terms “group” and “zone scene.” Indeed, the court already rejected this
 24 argument at claim construction where Google identified this flaw. None of the citations Sonos
 25 offers support such an understanding of the claims, and the reference to Google’s oral argument
 26 only supports Google’s position, which is that Sonos needs to identify a “common theme” in the
 27 accused products, which it has not done. Finally, Sonos argues that a group name “serves as the
 28 user’s shorthand label of the common theme that led the user to create the previously-saved group,”

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1 and therefore appears to conflate group names with the claimed “zone scene.” This is contrary to
 2 the specification, which uses group naming and zone scenes separately and distinguishes between
 3 them.

4 **“predefined”**: Sonos’s contentions fail to demonstrate that this limitation is satisfied. For
 5 example, Sonos appears to identify the join_group message as creating the “predefined grouping of
 6 zone players,” but Sonos does not identify when or how the group is “predefined” or what it is
 7 defined prior to. *See* Ex. D at 4. Sonos has identified no predefined groups that are created by
 8 Google or that are provided with the accused products to customers.

9 **’885 patent: “receiving, from a network device over a data network, a first indication**
 10 **that the first zone player has been added to a first zone scene” / “receiving, from the network**
 11 **device over the data network, a second indication that the first zone player has been added to**
 12 **a second zone scene”**

13 **’966 patent: “causing an indication of the first zone scene to be transmitted to the first**
 14 **zone player” / “causing an indication of the second zone scene to be transmitted to the first**
 15 **zone player”**

16 Sonos’s contentions fail to demonstrate that these limitations are satisfied. For example,
 17 Sonos appears to identify the join_group message as meeting these claim elements, but Sonos does
 18 not identify when or how the join_group message is received or transmitted after a first or second
 19 zone player has been added to a zone scene. Further, Sonos does not identify different
 20 instrumentalities meeting this claim element and the “causing creation of the first/second zone
 21 scene” element of the ’966 patent, and instead identifies the join_group message as satisfying both
 22 limitations, which is self-contradictory and inadequate. Sonos accuses the join_group message as
 23 creating the claimed “zone scenes,” not an indication of those zone scenes, and join_group does not
 24 have this functionality.

25 **“invoke” / “selected for invocation”**: Sonos’s contentions fail to demonstrate that this
 26 limitation is satisfied. For example, Sonos appears to accuse as “invoking” when a user performs a
 27 “‘cast’ to a previously-created ‘speaker group’ (and thereby cause the ‘speaker group’ to be
 28 invoked).” Ex. D. at 1. The accused devices are not “invoked” at all as claimed and instead may

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1 continue to be accessed through a tap or other physical interface to the device, permitting control of
 2 volume or media playback. Further, Sonos’s understanding of the “invoked” and “uninvoked” states
 3 is flawed. Sonos argues that the “Cast-enabled media players” are capable of existing in an
 4 uninvoked state and an invoked state:

5 Cast-enabled media player and that is capable of existing in two states – an uninvoked state
 6 in which each Cast-enabled player in the previously saved group is configured for individual
 7 playback of audio and an invoked state in which the Cast-enabled players in the previously-
 8 saved group are configured for synchronous playback of audio. Ex. D at 5.

8 But even under Sonos’s theories, the “Cast-enabled media player” would be “invoked” by a current
 9 “cast” command to it that initiated the alleged “individual playback of audio” and also if the “Cast-
 10 enabled media player” is playing audio in the “previously-saved” group. Accordingly, Sonos has
 11 not made any distinction between an invoked and an uninvoked group or “Cast-enabled media
 12 player” and therefore its infringement theories are flawed and Google denies them.

13 Finally, Sonos has not identified any infringement theory for the term “selected for
 14 invocation.” Ex. D at 10-11. Sonos appears to be accusing the same functionality of being
 15 “invoked” and being “selected for invocation,” but the terms are different and distinguished by the
 16 claims. *Id.* (“the Cast-enabled media player continues to operate in the standalone mode until one
 17 of the first ‘speaker group’ (which is the claimed ‘first zone scene’) or the second predefined
 18 “speaker group” (which is the claimed ‘second zone scene’) has been selected for
 19 invocation.”). Sonos has not identified any selection process for ‘invoking’ and therefore its
 20 infringement theories are deficient. The accused products do not practice the “selected for
 21 invocation” limitation.

22 **SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE:**

23 Subject to and without waiving the foregoing General and Specific objections, Google
 24 further responds, as follows:

25 **‘033 Patent (All Asserted Claims)**

26 On November 23, 2022, Sonos filed a motion for leave to amend to add new features and
 27 theories of infringement (“Amended Infringement Contentions”), including citations to numerous
 28

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1 new “exemplary” source code files. Sonos’s new allegations are vague, and ambiguous, and do not
2 adequately disclose Sonos’s theories of infringement. Google objects to these untimely
3 additions. Nevertheless, to the extent Sonos is permitted to introduce these new theories, Google
4 contends that its products do not infringe for at least the reasons discussed in its prior responses. In
5 addition to the reasons discussed above, Sonos’s Amended Infringement Contentions fail to
6 establish that the accused YouTube applications practice at least the following limitations:

7
8 **“remote playback queue provided by a cloud-based computing system associated with**
9 **a cloud-based media service.”** As Google explained in its prior response, a person of ordinary
10 skill in the art would understand that the plain meaning of a “remote playback queue provided by a
11 cloud-based computing system associated with a cloud-based media service” in the context of the
12 claims and specification requires a third-party playback queue. Google does not infringe under the
13 plain meaning because Sonos has not identified any third-party queue. Google incorporates by
14 references the briefing and exhibits on its Motion for Leave to file Supplemental Claim Construction
15 Briefing (Dkt. No. 375).
16

17 Google further incorporates by reference its third supplemental response to Sonos’s
18 Interrogatory No. 15. As explained in that response, when playing back media on the alleged
19 “computing device,” the accused YouTube application plays back a local queue stored on the
20 computing device. Thus, even under Sonos’s interpretation of “remote playback queue,” Sonos has
21 failed to show the accused YouTube application infringes the “remote playback queue” limitations
22 that require playback of the remote playback queue on the computing device.
23

24 **“detecting an indication that playback responsibility for the remote playback queue**
25 **has been successfully transferred from the computing device to the at least one given playback**
26 **device.”** Sonos has failed to show that the accused products satisfy this limitation. Sonos contends
27 that the accused products are “programmed with the functionality capability [*sic*] to detect an
28

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1 indication that playback responsibility for the remote playback queue has been successfully
2 transferred,” and asserts that this limitation is satisfied during a stream transfer because allegedly a
3 “Cast-enabled display will take back over playback responsibility that was the subject of the ‘stream
4 transfer’ if the Cast-enabled display does not receive such an indication.” Sonos’s contentions are
5 vague, ambiguous, and do not adequately disclose Sonos’s theories of infringement. The claim
6 language requires that the computing device “detect[] an indication that playback responsibility”
7 was “successfully transferred.” Even crediting Sonos’s allegations, Sonos fails to explain how
8 detecting that playback responsibility was *not* successfully transferred satisfies this limitation.
9

10 Moreover, the claims recite that the detection must occur before transitioning from the
11 claimed “first mode” to the claimed “second mode.” For example, the limitation that follows the
12 detecting limitation recites: “after detecting the indication, transitioning from i) the first mode in
13 which the computing device is configured for playback of the remote playback queue to ii) a second
14 mode in which the computing device is configured to control the at least one given playback device’s
15 playback of the remote playback queue and the computing device is no longer configured for
16 playback of the remote playback queue.” Sonos’s contentions do not explain how the transition
17 from the “first mode” to the “second mode” occurs “after detecting the indication.” For instance,
18 crediting Sonos’s allegation that the “Cast-enabled display will take back over playback
19 responsibility that was the subject of the ‘stream transfer’ if the Cast-enabled display does not
20 receive such an indication,” at most shows that the device will not transition from the claimed first
21 mode to the claimed second mode.
22
23

24 In short, Sonos has failed to present any theory establishing that the accused YouTube
25 applications “detect[] an indication that playback responsibility for the remote playback queue has
26 been successfully transferred from the computing device to the at least one given playback device,”
27 let alone a detection that occurs before transitioning from the first mode to the second mode.
28

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY**‘033 Patent (Claim 4)**

The accused YouTube applications do not infringe Claim 4 for at least the reason that Sonos has not shown a “representation of the one or more playback devices comprises at least one selectable indicator for a group of playback devices that includes the given playback device and one or more other playback devices that are to be configured for synchronous playback of the remote playback queue.” The accused YouTube applications do not include functionality for grouping speakers and Sonos has not shown YouTube applications have any awareness of whether a particular icon is for a speaker group. Thus, Sonos has failed to show that icons displayed in the YouTube applications are a “selectable indicator for a group of playback devices.”

’885 and ’966 Patents

Sonos’s infringement contentions are vague and ambiguous, and do not adequately disclose Sonos’s theories of infringement. Google contends that its products do not infringe for at least the reasons discussed in its prior responses. Based on source code print requests made by Sonos, which may indicate additional information regarding its infringement contentions, Google also discloses the following, while maintaining that Sonos’s Infringement Contentions fail to establish that the accused products practice at least the following limitations:

“standalone mode” (and all related limitations). Google hereby incorporates by reference its responses to Sonos’s interrogatory number 18.

“receiving a fourth request to invoke the second zone scene; and based on the fourth request, causing the first zone player to (a) cease to operate in accordance with the first predefined grouping of zone players such that the first zone player is no longer configured to coordinate with at least the second zone player to output media in synchrony with output of media by at least the second zone player.” Google’s accused products do not infringe because after the computing device “receiv[es] a fourth request to invoke the second zone scene,” with

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1 “invok[ing]” as contended by Sonos, the accused device would remain “configured to coordinate,”
2 with at least the second zone player, as required by the claims. Based on Sonos’s infringement
3 contentions, “invoking” (as contended by Sonos) the claimed “second zone scene” does not de-
4 configure the first zone player from coordinating with the second zone player as claimed. *See, e.g.,*
5 Almeroth 2022.07.27 Report at ¶289 (“it is this later, post-creation act of ‘invoking’ the previously-
6 saved ‘zone scene’ that causes each ‘zone player’ in the predefined and pre-saved group to configure
7 itself to play back audio in synchrony with the other member(s) of the predefined and pre-saved
8 group – prior to that time, a ‘zone player’ may receive an indication that it is a member of the
9 previously-created ‘zone scene’ that facilitates the saving of the previously-created ‘zone scene,’
10 but the ‘zone player’ will not automatically configure itself to play back audio in synchrony with
11 the other member(s) of the predefined group.”).

12
13 **“causing storage of the first zone scene at a location other than the computing device,**
14 **and wherein causing storage of the second zone scene comprises causing storage of the second**
15 **zone scene at the location other than the computing device.”** Google’s accused products do not
16 infringe at least because Google’s accused products do not store the composition of any given group
17 persistently “at a location other than the computing device” as claimed. Further, the accused
18 products do not store both the accused “first” and “second” “zone scenes” at that
19 same location. Sonos has not alleged that information not stored persistently meets the claim
20 limitation requiring “causing storage,” nor has Sonos alleged that a “location” could be a distributed
21 set of devices.
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1 DATED: November 29, 2022

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that all counsel of record who have consented to electronic service are being served with a copy of this document via email on November 29, 2022.

/s/ Anne-Raphaelle Aubry
Anne-Raphaelle Aubry